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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The fate of the American Indian and his treatment by 
white Europeans since the settlement of North America are to­
day very sensitive and important issues. Many feel that a 
great moral wrong has been committed by whites in their deal­
ings with the Indians. The primary objective of this study 
will be to present a descriptive narrative of the men. prob­
lems and events which made up American Indian policy from 
1800 to 1840. It is hoped this examination will show the 
development of the Indian removal policy and make clear Why 
this course was chosen over other alternatives. 
Francis Paul Prucha has recently examined these alter­
natives in an influential and revisionist essay. He concludes 
that by 1829, when Andrew Jackson took office as President, 
there were four possible solutions to the Indian probleml 
annihilation, assimilation, federal protection of Indians on 
small reserves or the removal of the tribes to areas west of 
the Mississippi. 1 In examining the development of the re­
moval policy these alternatives must be kept in mind. 
lFrancis Paul Prucha. "Andrew Jackson's Indian Policys 
A Reassessment." Journal Q.f American History, LVI (December. 
1969). 527-539. 
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Removal of the Eastern Indians to the western side of 
the Mississippi was the most recently developed of the four 
alternatives and its success involved bitter debate. armed 
confrontation and occasional bloodshed. The violence con­
nected with removal has caused many scholars to view the 
policy as an inhuman and cruel denial of Indian rights. 
Indian historians such as Grant Foreman. Angie Debo. Arthur 
DeRosier and Dee Brown have condemned the policy as racist. 
imperialistic and cultural genocide. Mary Young has char­
acterized removal as a tool which land speculators used to 
cheat the Indian out of his land. Prucha pointed out many 
of these evils but concluded that removal was the only viable 
alternative in Indian policy. The argument is endless. but 
the fact that many sincere and sympathetic supporters of 
Indian rights advocated the policy should caUse the reader 
to take a much more serious and in-depth look at removal. 
This narrative will attempt to provide a close. de­
tailed look at the development of the Indian removal policy. 
By trying to avoid value judgments throughout the work. the 
author will try to promote a better understanding of the 
policy. By focusing on the politics of Indian removal. the 
author hopes to explain why removal was chosen over the other 
alternatives. Key questions to be considered are when the 
leaders of the United States decided on removal of the Indians. 
what conditions made this necessary and the national political 
ramifications of the policy decision. Finally, the thesis 
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will describe key individuals, especially Andrew Jackson, in 
the hope that this will reveal the motives of the architects 
of Indian removal. Since it is the purpose of this study to 
examine the origin and development of the Indian removal 
policy, the focus will be on national politics and govern­
ment, little will be said about the actual implementation of 
the policy. The actual removal operations are important and 
controversial, but the policy was politically mature before 
they began. 
Both primary and secondary materials will be used in 
this study. The secondary sources include the works of most 
of the modern writers concerned with American Indian policy, 
such as Grant Foreman's Indian Removal' The Emigration of 
the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians; Arthur DeRosier's The 
Removal of the Choctaw Indians; and Francis Paul Prucha's 
American Indian Policy in the Formative Years' The Indian 
Trade and Intercourse Acts, 112Q-~. Among the most im­
portant primary sources utilized in this study are The 
Territorial P~pers 2f the United States, the Indian Affairs 
volumes of the American State Papers series, the Annals of 
Cqngress and various Senate and House Documents. In addi­
tion, the author used several collections of letters, 
diaries and personal accounts written by men who were con­
nected with Indian removal. These sources have been combined 
to give an overall picture and several differing interpreta­
tions on the SUbject, and have made it possible to stUdy 
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effectively the origin and development of the Indian removal 
policy. 
Chapter 2 
INDIAN POLICY BEFORE 1800 
Although during the colonial period there was no uni­
form Indian policy followed by British officials, several 
colonial conditions gave rise to general guidelines employed 
by the English in their dealings with the Indians. The most 
important of these was the maintenance of peace with the 
several tribes. 1 The very lives of the early colonists de­
pended upon the good will of the native Americans. Only 
when the colonies grew stronger and better able to defend 
themselves was peace no longer necessary for sheer survival. 
Moreover, Indian wars turned out to be costly and bloody, 
and as a result the English throughout the colonial period 
sought to maintain the allegiance and friendship of the 
natives. This effort took several forms. 
The English expressed a desire to convert and civilize 
the Indians. At Jamestown the colonists provided schools 
and money to teach Christianity and the civilized arts to 
lFrancis Paul Prucha, American Indian PolicX in the 
Formative Years I The Indian Trad~ and Intercourse Acts,
l12Q-1834 ~Cambridgel Harvard University Press, 19b2)7 pp. 
~ 
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the tribes. 1 This approach was doomed to fail early in 
colonial history. The gap between the two cultures was too 
vast to be bridged by giving a few Indians an education. 
After an Indian attack in Virginia in 1622 plans for educa­
tion and civilization of the natives diminished. 2 A few 
attempts along these lines continued during the colonial 
period, but successes were minimal and both the Indians and 
the colonists seemed apathetic toward the projects. 
It was going to be necessary, at least in the near 
future, for the two civilizations to live side by side. 
Doing this peaceably would make it necessary for England and 
her colonies to work out some regulations governing the con­
tact between Indians and whites. The major problem the 
English faced was the fact that their pattern of colonization 
involved a constant process of absorbing Indian land.) In 
order to maintain the goodwill of the natives, colonial 
officials adopted methods of land purchase which the Indians 
would accept. The English paid the tribes for land but 
abuses marred the transfer from the very beginning. To pre­
vent these abuses colonial laws were passed which negated all 
4land sales that did not have government approval. The 
l Angie Deba, A. History of the Indians Qf the United 
States (Normanl University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), pp. 40­
41. 
3Ib id ., p. 53. 
4Prucha, p. 6. 
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purpose was to prevent the tensions which arose from frauds 
committed against the Indians. 
Another point of contact between whites and Indians 
was that of trade. Trade with the tribes played a very im­
portant economic role in all the colonies. By 1673 Virginia 
traders had reached the Cherokee; even before this Carolina 
traders had made contact with the Creeks. Trade WaS begun 
with the Chickasaws in 1698 and the Choctaw were reached in 
1714. 1 In New England and the middle colonies the fur trade 
had always been a lure to new settlers. and this trade 
flourished throughout the colonial period. 
Realizing the importance of this trade. colonial 
governments insisted on controlling the trade from the be­
ginning. The licensing of traders became the universal means 
of regulation. 2 The colonial officials hoped to limit the 
trade to men who would deal honestly with the tribes and win 
their confidence and respect. 
International political considerations overshadowed 
even the importance of trade in the formulation of colonial 
Indian policy.3 In 1689 England and France began a century 
of war, which spilled over to North America. In these wars 
the Indians became pawns in the struggle of the rival powers 
4for control of the continent. Throughout this period the 
lDabo, p. 57. 2Prucha, p. 8. 
3Ibid ., p. 9. 4Debo. p. 54. 
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primary goal of English colonial Indian policy was to ensure 
the allegiance of the several tribes by making them dependent 
upon English trade. Giving presents to the Indians was a 
favorite method of aChieving this objective.! The English 
were at a disadvantage in dealing with the Indians because 
the nature of their colonization pressed the Indians to give 
up land. The French, who basically desired Indian trade and 
not land, were quick to point this out to the Indians. Only 
by fair dealings and generous presents could the English hope 
to win Indian allies. 
In order to insure honest behavior towards the tribes 
the British moved to strengthen their control over Indian 
trade and relations. In 1755 the British established 
northern and southern Indian Departments. Each department 
was headed by a superintendent whose responsibilities were to 
protect the Indians, distribute presents and enlist Indians 
as wartime allies. In addition, they were to exercise what 
control they could over the fur trade. 2 This procedure at­
tempted to establish royal control over Indian affairs. It 
showed the increasing necessity for a centralized, uniform 
Indian policy. The process of centralization was to continue. 
Although crown officials sought to limit those who 
could bUy Indian lands, the attempt was largely unsuccessful. 
This failure resulted in many frauds and abuses against the 
1Prucha, p. 9. 2Ibid ., p. 11. 
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natives. To correct this, orders were issued in 1761 pro­
hibiting royal colonial governors from issuing grants to 
Indian lands. The orders specified that all requests for the 
purchase of Indian lands were to be forwarded to the Board 
of Trade in England. 1 The English government had now taken 
direct control of trade, land purchase, and the giving of 
presents to the Indians, and yet, there were still many 
abuses on the frontier. Due to the vast extent of the wilder­
ness, trade and settlement were hard to regulate. The 
Indians began to realize that the advancing English frontier 
posed a far greater threat than the French fur trade. This 
caused many tribes (Shawnee, Cherokee, Indians of Ohio) to 
2
ally with the French during the French and Indian War. Un­
fortunately for these tribes the French lost and were driven 
from North America. By 176), when the French threat ended, 
English colonists began to spillover onto Indian lands.) 
Pontiac's "Rebellion" (176)-65) was the result of 
this, and although the Indians were again defeated, the war 
was so bloody and costly that the English were convinced they 
needed a different policy to preserve the peace. The prin­
ciples of the Proclamation of 176) had been considered prior 
to the uprising and seemed the best answer. Accordingly, the 
1 Ibid., p. 12. 2Debo, p. 6). 
)Ibid., p. 65. 
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edict was issued and for the first time the English set the 
boundary between the Indians and the whites. l English 
colonists were forbidden to settle west of a line which ran 
along the Appalachians from Canada to Florida. 2 Separating 
the two races was one way the British felt they could main­
tain peace. They also realized the need for a more effective 
regUlation of trade and in 1764 the frontier was divided into 
several small trading districts. Each area was to have a 
small fort and all trade was to be carried on at these posts 
under the direction of superintendents. This plan failed 
when the colonial governments refused to restrict the number 
of traders. 3 This left the restriction of white settlements 
as the major policy of the British. and this program became 
a great source of friction between the expansionistic 
Americans and the peace-conscious British. 
When the revolution broke	 out the Indians once again 
4became pawns in a power struggle. This time it was between 
the British and their American colonists. The Americans 
immediately realized the need to keep the Indians from join­
ing the British. In 1775 the Continental Congress established 
three Indian Departments (northern. southern, middle) and 
appointed commissioners for each. These appointees were to 
1Prucha, P' 13. 2Ibid ., p. 19. 
3Ray Allen Billington, 
of The American Frontier (New19491: pp. 140-141. . 
Westward Expansion, ! Historx 
Yorke The MacMillan Company, 
4Ibid ., p. 26. 
11 
attempt to keep the Indians neutral. 1 However. the British 
had more of a hold over the Indians. They had known and re­
spected agents. such as William Johnson and John Stuart. who 
wielded great influence among the tribes. These men could 
point out that it was the British who had restrained the 
American settlers and set a boundary between the farmers and 
the Redman. They tried to convince the tribes that if the 
British lost. the Americans would swarm onto their land. All 
of this was effective and most tribes sided with the British 
in the revolution. 2 Again. the Indians sided with the losers. 
At the end of the revolution the Americans were free and the 
British were driven into Canada. but the Indians still had 
to be pacified. The new government of the United States 
found itself faced with working out an Indian policy of its 
own. The goal of AmeriCan leaders Was to maintain peace with 
the Indians. and provide for an orderly advance of the fron­
tier.) In order to accomplish these tasks the new government 
adopted some of the old British principles and added some 
new concepts. 
By 178) most Americans agreed that Indian affairs be­
4longed in the hands of the central government. Thus the 
government issued a proclamation declaring that purchases of 
Indian lands which had not been approved by Congress were 
2Debo. p. 68. 
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null and void. In addition, the Commissioner of Indian Af­
fairs issued a report which said the first step was to 
establish boundaries between the white and red populations.1 
In spite of these acts the Articles of Confederation were 
rather vague on the subject of just who controlled Indian 
affairs. They stated that "The United states in Congress 
assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and 
power of ••• regulating the trade and managing all affairs 
with the Indians, not members of any of the states r provided 
that the Legislative right of any state within its own 
limits be not infringed or violated. 1I2 
While this gave the central government control over 
the tribes outside the boundaries of the states, it left state 
and central authority in unclear positions concerning Indians 
within the states, and made it difficult for either to act. 
Congress had thus begun to formulate a national Indian policy, 
but enforcing it was going to be difficult, particularly in 
view of the uncertain division of authority between the cen­
tral government and the states. 
In the first Indian treaties after the revolution 
Congress dealt with the Indians as if they were conquered 
nations. Peace commissioners simply dictated new boundaries 
without paying the Indians for the ceded land.) In reality, 
l Ibid ., p. 32. 2 Ibid ., pp. )0-)1. 
3Ib id •• p. 34. 
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the Indians hadn't been defeated and the trioes ignored 
these cessions. Congress was equipped with insufficient 
military power to enforce its decrees and the Indians, en­
couraged and supplied by England and Spain, continued to 
fight for the boundaries earlier recognized by the British 
1government.
During the continuing border war the government under 
the Articles of Confederation proceeded to establish federal 
authority over Indian affairs. In 1786 Congress enacted !tAn 
Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs." This act 
reasserted the right of Congress to deal with the Indians, 
copied the old British policy by creating northern and 
southern Indian Departments, and required all traders to be 
licensed. The licenses were to cost fifty dollars for one 
2 year and a bond of $3,000 was required for each trader.
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 added to the develop­
ing Indian policy of the United states. It stated that land 
could not be sold to white settlers until the Indian title 
had been extinguished by the government and the land had been 
surveyed. The ordinance also gave the territorial governor 
1Da1e Van Every, Disinherited I The Lost Birthright of 
the American Indian (New York' William Morrow & Company,f§b6), p. 87. 
2Thomas C. Cochran (ed.). The New American State 
Papers, Indian Affairs, Vol. VI (Wilmingtonl Scholarly 
Resources Inc., 1972), p. 15. 
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the job of identifying the tribal headmen and chiefs who 
were then to be attached to the United states by every means 
available. 1 These measures were working to develop an Indian 
policy for the United States. The new government using 
British colonial precedent was asserting federal control 
over dealings with the tribes. The preservation of peace 
was the main object. It was felt this could be obtained by 
restricting white-red contact and this restriction was to be 
achieved by regulating trade and controlling land sales. 
These policies of the government under the Articles met with 
limited success. The Articles had made the powers of the 
central government so vague that it could not enforce its 
position. 2 White settlers were advancing rapidly into 
Indian lands and the government was too weak to hold back the 
onslaught. As a last resort treaties were signed, with the 
Cherokee, Choctaw and Chickasaw at Hopewell, Georgia in 
1785 and 86, which fixed the boundaries of their territory 
and withdrew government protection from the white settlers 
who did not leave Indian lands within six months. The 
treaties also reasserted that Congress had the sole right of 
regUlating trade with the Indians and managing their affairs.) 
Thus, as the Confederation period drew to a close, Congress 
continued to assert its authority over Indian affairs in the 
1Debo, p. 73. 2Prucha, p. 36. 
3Ibid ., p. 35· 
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face of growing local pressure on the Indian territory. 
This was made difficult by the hazy relationship concerning 
state and federal authority over the Indians which was 
stated in the Articles of Confederation.1 
This confusion could have been cleared up by a 
stronger statement of authority in the Constitution. How­
ever. the Constitutional Convention gave little attention to 
Indian affairs. In the end the only mention of Indians was 
a short phrase which gave Congress the power to "regulate 
commerce •••with the Indian tribes." This was a small founda­
tion upon which to build a whole structure of federal legis­
lation regarding the Indians. 2 But the Washington adminis­
tration began the task of building a policy using this 
clause. experience from the colonial and confederation 
periods and clauses from the treaties signed at Hopewell. 
When Washington became President an Indian war was 
raging on the frontier. so his main problem waS to establish 
and maintain peace with the several tribes. There were two 
possible means to achieve this. The first method was to win 
a smashing victory over the Indians. Washington originally 
rejected this and attempted to implement the second alterna­
tive which Was outlined by Secretary of War Henry Knox in a 
report to the President on June 15. 1789. 
Knox suggested that a military victory over the 
16
 
hostile tribes waS an impossibility given the weakness of 
the new government. Moreover, he argued that such military 
action would be inhumane and unjust. His plan was to form 
"treaties of peace with them in which their rights and limits 
should be explicitly defined, and the treaties observed on 
the part of the United States with the most rigid justice, 
by punishing whites, who should violate the same. fI Knox felt 
that a liberal system of justice was necessary for the redmen 
because their right to possess land had been recognized by 
the treaty of Fort Harmar in January, 1789.1 In this treaty 
the United States had for the first time paid (in trade 
goods valued at $3,000) the Indians for land. 2 
Knox wanted to continue this policy, and Washington 
agreed. This strategy became the cornerstone of the Washing­
ton Administration's Indian policy and the old concept of 
title by conquest was abandoned. The new policy called for 
the United States to negotiate with the tribes, demonstrate 
liberalness toward them, provide guarantees against white en­
croachment on Indian lands and give compensation for land 
cessions.) 
1Cochran, I, p. 12. 
2Charles J. Kappler (ed.), Indian Treaties, ~-1883 
(New Yorks Interland Publishing Co., 1972}, p. 24. 
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Accepting these principles, Washington and Knox be­
gan to build a national Indian policy. This involved waiv­
ing the right of conquest, the establishment of definite 
boundaries between whites and Indians, treaty payments for 
land cessions, and efforts to win Indian allegiance to the 
United States through the fostering and development of trade. 
As Washington reported to the Senate in 1790, II the trade of 
the Indians is a main means of their political management."l 
Although seemingly humane, this policy was underlined by the 
contradictory purpose of extending and protecting the fron­
tier. In order to do this, Washington felt the Indians must 
be assisted in learning the arts of civilization. This would 
enable them to exist within more restricted boundaries. He 
proposed to accomplish this by giving them domestic animals 
and farm implements, and by encouraging missionaries to live 
2 
among them. This plan marked a return to the concept that 
the Indians could be educated and assimilated, and added a 
further dimension to the developing American Indian policy. 
Having outlined the program it was now up to Congress 
to act upon it. On July 22, 1790 Congress passed the first 
of several Bets designed to "regulate trade and intercourse 
with the Indian tribes." This act provided for the licensing 
lJamas D. Richardson (ad.), Messages and Papers of the 
Presidents, .1Z.§2-1.§.21 (Washington, D.C .. G.p.a., 1896), Vol. 
I, p. 7b. 
2 Ibid •• p. 74. 
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of traders and established penalties for trading without a 
license. It also reasserted that Indian lands could be pur­
chased only by public treaties with the United States. 
Finally, it provided for the punishment of whites who com­
mitted crimes in the Indian country. Congress was assuming 
full authority to control relations and trade with the 
Indians. However, in this assertion of power the Congress 
was cautious, and since this was an experiment, the bill was 
1to be in force for only two years.
President Washington approved these directions and in 
1791, in his third annual message, restated the principles 
that he wanted to follow. He called for "impartial dispensa­
tions of justice" towards the Indians and carefully laid out 
a method of purchasing their lands. He asked for the promo­
tion of commerce with the Indians "under regulations tending 
to secure an equitable deportment towards them." He re­
emphasized that "rational experiments" be used to impart to 
the Indians the "blessings of civilization" and asserted his 
authority as President to give presents to the tribes. In 
addition Washington asked for the means to punish those who 
infringed upon Indian rights, violated treaties and endangered 
the peace of the United States. 2 
1Prucha, pp. 45-46. 
2Richardson. Vol. I, pp. 104-105. 
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In March. 1792. Washington went further and stated 
that "in managing the affairs of the Indian tribes generally 
it appears proper to teach them to expect annual presents 
conditioned on the evidence of their attachment to the 
United States."l Nagged by prolonged Indian wars in the 
Northwest. Washington was trying to bribe the tribes into 
peace. so that he could begin his less expensive system of 
liberal justice. 
This reaffirmation of faith in the newly begun policy 
encouraged Congress to enact a much stronger law than the act 
of 1790. On March 1. 1793. a new statute was passed which 
greatly expanded the provisions of the earlier bill. The 
President was authorized to give goods and money to the 
tribes lito promote civilization and secure continuance of 
their friendship.tI A long section was added which was de­
signed to stop the criminal attacks of whites against the 
Indians and irregular white acquisition of Indian land. 2 
Despite these efforts white encroachment and illegal 
trading went on unrestrained throughout the period. The 
government was not strong or rich enough to enforce its 
policy on a large frontier. Washington noted in December, 
1795 that violence against Indians could be "perpetrated with 
impunity" and complained that unless this could be stopped 
nothing could prevent "destructive retaliation" by the 
l Ibid •• p. 122. 2Prucha, p. 47. 
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Indians.! 
Added to the problem was the policy of Great Britain 
which encouraged the Indians north of the Ohio to form a con­
federacy and force the Americans out of this area. By 1789 
white depredations became too much and the Indians revolted 
2
against the growing pressure. As a result, while Washington 
advocated and Congress passed peaceful and noble sounding 
measures, a fierce Indian war was fought on the frontier. 
In response the administration sought a military solution to 
the problem. It was not until 1795 when the Indians north of 
the Ohio were crushed by General Wayne that the government 
had a chance to institute the regulatory policies which had 
been adopted. 
Washington, confident that he could win the friendship 
of the Indians through trade, urged a system of government 
trading houses and, on April 18, 1796, Congress passed "An 
Act Establishing Trading Houses with The Indian Tribes." 
This act authorized the establishment of trading houses or 
factories, as they were called, at places convenient for car­
rying on a "liberal trade" with the tribes. The two-fold 
purpose of the factories was to win the allegiance of the 
tribes through trade and to wean the tribes away from foreign 
influence. The system was to run for two years but waS kept 
lRichardson, Vol. I, p. 185. 
2Billington, pp. 222-223­
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alive until 1822.1 
In May, 1796 Congress acted again and passed hThe 
Intercourse Act of 1796. h This re-established the old 
clauses of the Bill of 1793 and in order to prevent encroach­
ment, it specified in detail the boundary line for the 
Indian territory. This was again a temporary measure, but 
was re-enacted in 1799 and stayed in force into the Jefferson 
.. . 2 
adm::tnlstrat::ton. During Washington's administration the 
principles were adopted which would influence American 
Indian policy for a century. The beliefs, actions and role 
of the government were mostly based on colonial, revolution­
ary and the pre-constitution national experiences. In 
spite of vigorous efforts to treat the Indians fairly, 
illegal trade and white encroachment continued unchecked. 
The frontier was just too extensive and the enforcing 
agencies were inadequate. Also other problems appeared more 
pressing and the money was seldom available to pursue an 
aggressive Indian policy.) It was obvious that the federal 
government could not protect the Indians from the advance of 
white population. The greatest problem with the policy was 
lRoyal B. Way, "The United States Factory System for 
Trading with the Indians, 1796-1822," Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, VI (September, 1919), 220-235· 
2Billington, pp. 49-50. 
3Ibid ., p. 36. 
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that the goals of "preserving peace" and "extending the 
frontier" were directly contradictory to one another. In 
order to extend the frontier, more land was needed from the 
Indians; and as this land was demanded the hate and the ten­
sion increased. 
In spite of this the United States attempted to 
achieve both these goals for many years. When John Adams 
became President, he had to devote much of his attention to 
the breakup of the Federalist party. As a result Adams and 
his Secretary of War, James McHenry, added little that was 
new to Indian policy. Both men were content to try and fol­
low the program which Washington and Knox worked so hard to 
build. Luckily the frontier remained reasonably calm and 
Adams was free to devote much needed time to foreign affairs. 
It was Thomas Jefferson who finally developed an alternative 
policy. 
Chapter 3 
THE ORIGINS OF REMOVAL 
Throughout his life Thomas Jefferson maintained a 
keen interest in-the Indian tribes of North America. He 
diligently collected information on their languages, cus­
toms, historical origins and traditions. 1 When he became 
President, Jefferson continued the search for methods to 
preserve the tribes and to allow for continued expansion 
of the United States. He felt strongly that Indians could 
be taught the arts of civilization and ultimately assimilated 
into white society. He felt that Indians who relapsed into 
barbarism would be driven "with the beasts of the forest into 
the stony mountains. II2 With this in mind; he adopted two 
goals for his policy. The first was to civilize the Indians; 
but the main object of this policy was to relieve the land 
between the Mississippi and the Appalachians of its Indian 
population. Remembering the Indian wars and British intrigue 
of the 1790's, Jefferson claimed this was necessary for 
lFrancis W. Hirst, Life and Letters of Thoma~ 
Jefferson (New York. MacMillan Co., 1926), p. 16. 
2Saul K. Padover, A Jeffersonian Profile (New York. 
The John Day Company, 195b), p. 206. 
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purposes of defense. 1 
When Jefferson took the office of President the Indians 
were generally peaceful. This was reflected in Jefferson's 
first annual message to Congress. He told Congress that 
"Among our Indian neighbors • • • a spirit of peace and 
friendship prevails." For this good fortune he credited con­
tinued efforts to introduce agricultural and household goods 
among the Indians and promised to continue the policy.2 
With increasing vigor Jefferson intensified efforts to 
civilize and assimilate the Indian tribes. He was positive 
that the "Indian can no longer live a semi-nomadic life of 
hunting and fishing." In his opinion the Indians had. to 
turn to farming. He called for red and white settlements to 
mix and become one peoPle.) In 1802 Jefferson made a plea 
for a patient and just policy and urged that the tribes be 
given domestic implements and fine instructors to enlighten 
4the Indians on their proper use. In the same year Jefferson 
tried to establish specific boundaries between white 
lArthur H. DeRosier, Jr., The Removal of the Choctaw 
Indians (Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1970)~ 
p. 26. 
2James D. Richardson (ed.). Messages and Papers of the 
fresidents, 12~2-1§21,.V01. I (Washington, Government Print­
lng Office, f89b). p. )26. 
":l/DeRosier, p. 24. 
4Richardson, p. )52. 
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settlements and the Indian country. Congress was given the 
role of deciding how long the Indians could have a monopoly 
of their vast land claims before actual habitation became 
necessary for ownership.1 If Congress authorized treaty 
negotiations and the Senate ratified treaties of land ces­
sion, Jefferson would sign them. This would achieve his 
important goal of obtaining Indian land and also absolve him 
from the responsibility of depriving the Indians of their 
land while trying to civilize them. In 1803 Jefferson at­
tempted to explain how these two goals worked together. He 
said that the "promotion of agriculture and household manu­
facture are essential" to Indian preservation, and therefore 
he encouraged it liberally. He rationalized that these arts 
encouraged the tribes to live on smaller portions of land 
which made their forests useless. Jefferson felt that the 
Indians would need less land, while the increasing numbers of 
whites needed more and their interests would, thus, coincide. 
He restated the belief that Indian and white settlements 
should blend together and called this assimilation a natural 
2 process. 
By this time, Jefferson had carefully laid out the 
process by which the Indians would be civilized. First. he 
would teach them to raise cattle and in this way they would 
acquire a knowledge of the value of property. The next step 
2Hirst. p. 402. 
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was to teach them arithmetic so that they could calculate 
this value. After this the redman would be taught to write 
and keep accounts, and during this stage the Indians would 
begin to increase their farms and the men would labor while 
the women began to spin and weave. Finally, instructors 
would teach the tribesmen how to read and institute a "regu­
1lar" government. This process sounded reasonable. but it 
asked too much too quickly. The Indians could not become 
civilized fast enough to keep pace with white demands for 
their land and throughout the Jefferson administration the 
demand for land cessions intensified. From the very outset 
of Jefferson's presidency almost every treaty with the var­
ious tribes forced the Indians to give up their land in one 
way or another. In 1801 the Choctaw ceded a large portion of 
2land along the Mississippi to the United states. In 1802 
the Creeks relinquished a sizeable tract in the State of 
Georgia. Both the Choctaw and the Chickasaw allowed wagon 
roads, which connected Tennessee with the deep south, to be 
built across their lands. In the north the New York tribes 
and the Ohio Indians had ceded much of their land by 1803. 
Systematically the Americans were driving the Indians off 
lBernard Mayo (ed.), Jefferson Himself. The Personal 
Narrative of a Man;y;-Sidec;i American {Charlottesvillel The 
University Press of Virginia, 1970), p. 293· 
2Charles J. Kappler (ad.), Indian Treaties, ~­
188J (New York. Interland Publishing Co., 1972), p. 57· 
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their lands. In return the tribes received payment in 
either money or goods. 
In order to achieve his goals of preserving peace, 
civilizing the tribes and opening up the region between the 
ApPalachians and the Mississippi for white settlement, 
Jefferson placed heavy reliance upon the use and expansion 
of trade. By using the factories Jefferson felt the Indians 
could be rendered more dependent on the United States. He 
hoped to introduce the implements of civilization to the 
redmen through this trade and make them dependent upon the 
new tools. In this way, the Indians would come to rely upon 
the United States to supply these goods. Jefferson was con­
vinced that "commerce is the great engine by which we are to 
coerce them and not war."l He admitted that "the most 
economical and humane conduct towards them is to bribe them 
into peace and retain them in peace by eternal bribes." But 
this expansion of commerce worked in another way also. 
Jefferson saw that when the Indians ran up debts at the trad­
ing houses they were often willing to lop them off with land 
cessions. 2 He decided to enlarge the government factory sys­
tem and encourage the Indians to buy more and more goods on 
credit. Once the Indian debts became so burdensome that they 
1Padover , p. 1?3• 
2prancis Paul Prucha. American Indian Policy in the 
Formative Years. Th~ Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts,1290­
18J4 (Cambridget Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 88. 
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couldn't pay, the agents would inform the tribes that the 
United States would liquidate the debts by accepting land 
cessions. 1 This put the trading houses in the land cession 
business and made Indian agents responsible for making the 
tribes give up their land. Jefferson hinted at this in 180) 
when he said that each agent "shall be estimated by us in 
proportion to the benefits he can obtain for us.,,2 This was 
in line with another purpose of Jefferson's policy, which waS 
to free the land from Indian title and make it available to 
white farmers. Any doubt about this was cleared up in a mes­
sage to Congress which Jefferson delivered in180). He in­
dicated that the tribes were becoming uneasy about losing 
their land and were beginning to refuse to sell. He advo­
cated two methods for counteracting this. Initially, he 
wanted to encourage the Indians to abandon hunting and take 
up agriculture. This, he felt, would make their vast forests, 
which were necessary for hunting, useless. In addition, 
Jefferson wanted "to multiply trading houses among them, and 
place within their reach those things which will contribute 
more to their domestic comfort than the possession of exten­
sive but uncultivated wilds. 1I This would teach the tribes to 
exchange what they could spare (land) for what they desired 
Jand the United States had to spare. Using these methods 
lDeRosier, p. 27. 2Ibid ., p. 26. 
JRichardson, I, p. J40. 
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Jefferson was sure he could obtain land cessions without en­
dangering the peace. In spite of the fact that the Indian 
lost his way of life, Jefferson did not think his policy was 
necessarily cruel and felt that the tribes could be civilized 
and assimilated. 
By the end of his administration the policy was in 
full swing. In 1802 Jefferson pushed a new "Trade and Inter­
course Act" through Congress. It was a restatement of the 
laws of 1796 and 1799. However this time the law was made 
permanent and not temporary.l The President, thus, had the 
control of Indian trade which he needed, and he had a system 
of government factories, which Washington had set up. In 
order to better organize these an act was passed on April 21, 
1806. This law established an office of the superintendent 
of Indian Trade, who was charged with purchasing goods. trans­
porting them, and directing the work of factors. 2 This 
helped end some confusion within the system and allowed 
Jefferson to direct a uniform policy through one man. These 
two laws gave the President the foundation on which to build 
his policies. By 1808 there was evidence that Jefferson's 
policies were working. Feeling that the United States should 
purchase the whole east bank of the Mississippi the President 
decided to buy lands which the Choctaw held. He told Congress 
that this would be easy since the Choctaws. "being indebted 
1Prucha. p. 50. 
30 
to certain merchantile characters beyond what could be dis­
charged by the ordinary proceeds of their huntings, and be­
ing pressed for payment by these creditors, proposed at 
length to the United States to cede lands to the amount of 
their debts • • • " Eventually the Choctaw ceded about 
15,000,000 acres. This was the way in which the system 
worked. 
But by now another important aspect had become vis­
ible in Jeffersonian Indian policy. With the Louisiana 
Purchase Jefferson began to see a new method of dealing 
with the Indians. In 1803 he wrote to Andrew Jackson that 
the Louisiana Purchase would open an "asylum" for the 
Indians and lito our prosperity it opens a noble prospect of 
2provision for ages." Thus Jefferson developed the idea of 
exchanging lands west of the Mississippi for Indian lands 
east of the river. This idea of removing the Indians west 
of the Mississippi was to become the most significant and 
':l 
far reaching innovation in American-Indian relations. J It 
was an admission that the Indians could not be assimilated 
fast enough to keep up with white land demands, and it was 
lMessages, Vol. I, p. 422. 
2Adrienne Kock, Jefferson and Madison (New York' 
Alfred A. Knoph, 1950), p. 244. 
JDeRosier, p. 27. 
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a way to take their land without exterminating them. This 
was important, for it had become obvious that despite Jeffer­
son's attempts to keep the red and white races apart the 
government could not protect the Indians. 1 Frontiersmen 
2often saw Indians as murdering savages. These whites 
would organize and invade Indian territories, killing the 
inhabitants and settling on the land.) As early as 1802 
Governor C. C. Claibourne of Mississippi WaS complaining 
that he was powerless to punish whites who settled on Indian 
4land that WaS not surveyed. All this meant that aggressive 
white settlers and traders were intruding on the Indian 
without restraint. In spite of official policy, it looked 
as though the Indians would be destroyed, like the New 
England tribes, rather than assimilated. With the Louisiana 
Purchase Jefferson could obtain Indian land and also provide 
the Indians with an alternative to extermination. 
He began to develop this idea immediately. Jefferson's 
proposed amendment to authorize the Louisiana Purchase advo­
cated removal of the Indians to the region beyond the 
1Wilcomb E. Washburn, Red Man's Land/White Man's Lawl 
~ Study of the Past and Present Status Qf the American 
Indian (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), pp. 60-61. 
2DeRosier, p. ). 3Prucha, p. 150. 
4DeRosier, p. )0. 
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Mississippi river. Although the amendment was not accepted, 
an act was passed in 1804, which authorized the President to 
negotiate with the Indians for removal. 1 This was the be­
ginning of the policy of removing the eastern tribes west of 
the Mississippi river. The problem that remained was the fact 
that the Indians were strong in many areas and did not want 
to remove. Peace was a high priority of Jefferson's and 
thus he pushed removal only mildly and continued to use his 
factory system to obtain land cessions. Removal, however, 
WaS not forgotten. It was the policy of the future, and when 
Indian power was broken by defeats in the War of 1812 the 
federal government pursued this idea aggressively to its con­
clusion. Jefferson had only one very small success with re­
moval. This was with the Cherokee. In 1809 this tribe sent 
an exploring party west of the Mississippi. The reports of 
the party were favorable and soon approximately 1,130 Cherokee 
were living in northwestern Arkansas. 2 This removal had been 
voluntary (no treaty was ever signed) and was the decision 
of individual Indians. However, it was a start, and it was 
an example for future Presidents. 
In summary, Thomas Jefferson embarked upon a policy 
lAngie Debo, The Rise and Fall of the Choctaw Republic 
(Norman: University-oI Oklahoma Press~1934), p. 3b. 
2Angie Debo, ! History of the Indians of the United 
States (Normans University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), p. 89. 
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designed to free more Indian land for white use. At the 
same time, he attempted to preserve the Indians through 
civilization and assimilation. When the tribes began to re­
sist both of these efforts, Jefferson turned to bribery to 
gain Indian land. Liquidating tribal debts with land ces­
sions kept a steady supply of new land coming to the United 
States, but it spelled doom for the nomadic Redman. The 
Louisiana Purchase gave Jefferson a new method to avoid 
Indian annihilation and warfare. He would simply remove the 
Indians from the flow of white settlers. The strength of 
the tribes and the threat of war prevented Jefferson from 
actively carrying out this policy, but he did originate it 
and began to establish the procedure needed to effect it. 
James Madison faced much the Same problem when he be­
came President. The strength of the tribes and Madison's 
initial dislike for removal deterred efforts to implement the 
policy. However, during Madison's administration the mili­
tary power of the tribes east of the Mississippi would be 
broken, and this would completely change the situation and 
Madison's thinking. After retiring from public life, Madison 
wrote that "next to the case of the black race within our 
bosom, that of the redman on our borders is the problem most 
baffling to the policy of our country."! By 1830 the 
IHarold S. Schultz, James Madison (New York. Twayne 
Publishers, Inc., 1970), p. 197· 
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ex-president had come to see removal as the only hope for 
the Indian. He concluded that "It is evident that they can 
never be happy within the bounds of a state, either in a 
separate or sUbject character, that a removal to another home, 
if a good one can be found, may well be the wish of their 
best friends."l 
This view was different from any Madison held as 
President. During his administration he had to worry con­
stantly about the Indians allying with the British in Canada 
and being influenced by foreign agents in the south. In 
order to win the friendship and trust of the tribes Madison 
wished to halt white encroachment upon Indian lands. This 
meant an end to the land cessions approved by Jefferson. Yet 
Madison believed, as did Jefferson. that it was necessary to 
civilize the tribes by introducing goods among them and 
thereby teaching the Indians concepts of private property. 
Throughout his administration this was Madison's goal. 
In March. 1809, Madison proposed by "authorized means" 
to lift the American aborigines from "degradation and wretch­
2
edness" to a civilized state. He continued to attempt this 
policy throughout the stormy period of his presidency. Dur­
ing the War of 1812 Madison advised some chiefs, who were 
2Irving Brant. James Madison, The President, 1809-181 2 
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970), p. ~05. 
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visiting Washington, to breed cattle, sheep, plow the earth, 
and, most importantly, live in peace with each other. 1 This 
was despite the fact that many of the tribes had allied with 
the British in the fighting. Other Presidents would probably 
have lost patience, but Madison remained firm in his policy 
of trying to win the friendship of the tribes. As late as 
1815 Indian agents were being instructed that the principle 
object of the United States government was to introduce use­
ful arts among their Indian allies. The government wanted 
to teach the Indians industry by instructing the men in 
agriculture and stockraising and teaching the women the arts 
of spinning and weaving. It was planned that the United 
States would provide the apparatus necessary for the manu­
facture of linen and cotton clothing. The government would 
also supply agricultural implements, sheep and cattle. It 
was hoped that the Indian would begin to sell their surplus 
goods and realize the value of trade. 2 This policy ran 
throughout Madison's two terms. It was patterned after 
Jefferson's attempts at civilizing the Indians. However, 
Madison did not condone the use of the credit system to gain 
Indian land. 
Instructions to Indian agents in 1815 emphasized the 
l Ibid ., p. 513. 
2Clarence Edwin Carter (ed.), The Territorial PaQers 
of the United States (Washingtonl u.s. Government Printing 
Office, 1950), XVII, p. 199. 
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importance of encouraging fair and honest trade between 
white and red men by preserving peace, prohibiting the intro­
duction of "spirits" among the tribes, and protecting the 
Indians from fraud and conspiracy.1 This attitude reflected 
the government's concern with regulating the activities of 
the private traders who were increasingly hostile to the oper­
ations of the factory system. The only way the government 
could compete with the private traders was to offer cheap 
trading goods. 
The administration's trading policy was also designed 
to pUll the tribes away from the influence of British traders. 
The British retained great power among the Indians in the 
Northwest and with relations deteriorating between the United 
States and England, British traders were working in earnest 
to keep the firm allegiance of the Indians in that quarter. 
By 1811 it was generally feared along the frontier that, in 
case of war, the British would win over the Indians again 
with generous presents and the promise of military support 
to stop the advance of the American pioneers. It was sug­
gested that more government factories might counteract this 
. t' . fl 2Brl Ish In uence. 
Madison's policy was constantly under attack from 
westerners. Governor William Henry Harrison of Indiana 
Territory spoke for many in his area when he asked the 
lIbid •• p. 200. 2Ibid •• p. 178. 
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government, "ls one of the fairest portions of the globe to 
remain in a state of nature, the haunt of a few wretched 
savages, when it seems destined by the Creator to give sup­
port to a large population, and to be the seat of civiliza­
tion, of science, and of religion?"l Most westerners were 
opposed to Madison's cautious policy concerning Indian lands 
and wanted cessions and removal to open the territories for 
settlement. Harrison, in fact, negotiated land cessions in 
the Indiana Territory and sent them to Congress for ratifi­
cation. The President remained cool to this action because 
he desired to maintain peace with the Indians. W~dison 
wanted to avoid war with the British and realized that any 
Indian outbreak would heighten a call for war against the 
British from Americans who blamed British influence for 
d " h "l"t" 2In lan ostl 1 leSt 
When Harrison finally pushed the Indians into violent 
action the President had to give in. After the Tippecanoe 
encounter in 1811 Madison shifted and began to use the event 
to justify war preparations. 3 Even before 1811 Madison had 
yielded to western pressure by signing the Uland-grabbing" 
treaties negotiated by Harrison. 4 
In his War Message to Congress Madison related Indian 
lBrant, p. 190. 2 Ibid ., p. 338. 
4Carter, XVI, p. 178. 
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hostilities to British intrigues. This was a topic which he 
had earlier avoided in negotiations with England. 1 Madison 
appeared correct in his evaluation, however. The Indians in 
the Northwest did, for the most part, fight with the British 
and the influence of British traders was an important factor 
in the decision. It must be remembered, however, that 
Governor Harrison had been constantly pressuring the tribes 
to give up their land and they were beginning to resist. The 
promise of British support in a war against the Americans 
was all the Indians needed to go on the warpath. 
During the conflict, Madison continually stressed that 
it was the fault of the British that the Indians were at war, 
even though this was only one of the factors. He was also 
careful to separate hostiles from peacefUl Indians and kept 
urging the arts of civilization upon the friendly tribes. 
In his fourth annual message in 1812 Madison accused the 
British of making use of merciless savages. He claimed that 
the United States had long promoted a IIbenevolent ll policy of 
pursuing peace and civilization among that "wretched portion 
of the human race. 1I All the United states desired for the 
Indians was to remain neutral and in Madison's eyes the 
English were working against this. He quickly added, though, 
that liThe Indian tribes not under foreign instigations remain 
at peace, and receive the civilizing attentions which have 
lprucha, pp. 76-77. 
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proved so beneficial to them."l He was clearly separating 
the tribes and laying the blame for Indian unrest at the 
British doorstep. Madison never admitted that the Indians 
might have had some legitimate complaints against the in­
creasing encroachment of the Americans. In December, 1813 
he restated his feelings when he told Congress that the enemy 
was still enlisting "savages". Madison was referring to a 
faction of the Creeks, the "Red sticks" who had recently gone 
to war against the United States and he lamented that this 
tribe had been moving towards civilization, and had become 
the unfortunate victims of British seduction. 2 The Red Sticks 
reward for joining the British was complete and disastrous 
defeat at the hands of Andrew Jackson. Their military power 
was broken forever. In the north the Indians suffered much 
the Same fate. Harrison was able to completely break Indian 
power in the Old Northwest. As the war ended the position of 
the Indian had been weakened critically. Militarily the 
tribes east of the Mississippi could never seriously threaten 
the United States again. This opened the way for the revital­
ization of the cession and removal policies which Jefferson 
had practiced. 
The only advantage the Indian had was that the Americans 
lJoint Committee on Printing of the House and Senate, 
~essages and rapers_?f the Presidents, Vol. II (New York: 
bureau of NatIonal LIterature, Inc., 1897), p. 500. 
2Ibid ., p. 520. 
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still feared the British influence which came from the 
Canadian traders. Governor Ninian Edwards of Illinois wrote 
to Secretary of War Crawford in 1816 that to counteract this 
British influence the Indians should be given goods liberal­
ly. He felt that tribes should be treated jUdiciously and 
kept in a good humor for two or three more years. After this 
the growth of the white population would prevent any future 
dangers. 1 It was becoming obvious that once the frontier 
whites felt strong enough, they would not hesitate to en­
croach upon Indian lands. 
To assist in the strengthening of frontier defenses, 
Congress passed a bill on April 29, 1816 which forbid the 
sale of trading licenses to non-citizens. This restrictive 
legislation and the growth of the American Fur Company gen­
erally forced out the British traders and their influence 
east of the Mississippi. 2 It also boded ill-tidings for the 
Indians, for even before thi~white intruders had been spill­
ing onto their lands. 
The force of these intruders was too great to be held 
back. They knew that the government did not have the troops 
to continue effective patrol of the Indian territory and 
moved onto these lands. If they were discovered and removed 
they could easily return. In 1815 so many intruders moved 
lCarter, Vol. XVII, pp. 398-401. 
? ~Schultz, ppe 77-81. 
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onto Cherokee land in Mississippi that federal authorities 
wanted to give up and let them remain. These intruders were 
not even worried about civil court actions succeeding against 
them. 1 
It was much the same in the north and in November of 
1815 Ninian Edwards complained bitterly about the situation. 
He was satisfied that the powers and duties of Indian super­
intendents and agents were too limited for any real use, and 
felt he had no power to enforce the Indian trade acts because 
he had no military or civil help. In addition, the people 
who settled on Indian lands were so remote, they could not 
be removed. He said it was difficult or impossible to get 
legal proof to convict intruders, and ended by claiming that 
the licensing system was so defective anyone could trade. 2 
The system had obviously broken down. With the military 
power of the Indians gone, the settlers were not afraid to 
band together and intrude on tribal lands. The government 
was helpless and Madison's only hope was to get cessions from 
the Indians fast enough to keep up with white pressure. 
The situation was so hopeless by 1816 that Secretary 
of War Crawford, who strongly supported the factory system, 
bitterly asked the Senate to choose between civilizing the 
lprucha, pp. 162-163. 
2Thomas C. Cochran (ed.), The New American state 
Papers, Indian Affairs (Wilmingtonl Scholarly Resources, 
Inc., 1972), Vol. J, pp. 240-241. 
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Indians or driving them off their land. On March 14, he 
said that the Indians had advanced as a result of the fac­
tories, but only slightly, and went on to say that if civil­
ization was wanted for the Indians, and not the alienation 
of their land, then this system should continue. Crawford 
felt that if the system was skillfully applied for a number 
of years it would not fail to make the Indians recognize the 
idea of separate property. He said this was a prerequisite 
to any advancement the Indians made in the arts of civiliza­
tion. Crawford then told the Senate that the time had 
arrived when trade must be expanded, or abandoned to private 
enterprise. He sarcastically contended that, if the govern­
ment wanted to extinguish Indian land title as rapidly as 
possible, trade should be abandoned entirely to private enter­
prise, without regulation. He said that the result of this 
would be the extermination of the Indians or their expulsion 
to a distant land. 1 During Madison's administration, Con­
gress did not act on Crawford's desires to strengthen the 
factory system. It was becoming obvious, however, that the 
old policy of ciVilizing the Indians through using the fac­
tories was failing. This was because the government could 
not protect the Indians from white intrusion or illegal 
traders. The government was in a weakened position and there 
was, at this point, no organized, effective policy. 
l Ibid ., pp. 188-190. 
, .' 
Madison was simply trying to get as many land ces­
sions as it took to keep up with white settlement. In his 
eighth and final Annual Message to Congress on December 3, 
1816 all Madison had to report concerning Indians was that 
several tribes appeared disposed to remain at peace, and that 
from several of them land purchases had been made. 1 
As Madison left office it was apparent that the Indians 
were in a new and critical position. The government had 
never been aole to protect the tribes effectively, and by the 
end of the War of 1812, the Redmen could no longer protect 
themselves. The War had also removed the British threat and 
opened up broad expanses of the frontier for settlement. 
Whites began to pour onto the frontier and pressure the 
Indians for their land. Madison could not cope with this, 
but the new president, James Monroe, would try to find the 
answer in removal. 
lRichardson, II, p. 560. 
Chapter 4 
THE QUEST FOR MODERATE REMOVAL 
During the administrations of James Monroe the United 
States experienced a dramatic westward movement, a "Great 
Migration" to frontier areas of the Northwest and the South­
west. The War of 1812 had removed British influence along 
the frontier and had also diminished the threat which Indian 
tribes posed to settlers. As a result, between 1817 and 
1825 the popUlation surged westward and created a distinct 
western political interest. This was best evidenced by the 
number of states that entered the Union during this period. 
Indiana became a state in 1816; Mississippi followed in 1817, 
Illinois in 1818, Alabama in 1819, Missouri in 1821, and 
Arkansas Territory was organized in 1819. The new political 
entities, representative of aggressive frontiersmen, applied 
increasing pressure upon federal authorities to obtain land 
cessions from the Indian tribes at any cost. 
Others events during this period set the stage for in­
creasing Indian-white tension east of the Mississippi. The 
Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819 set a definite western boundary 
between the united States and Spain and secured Florida for 
the Americans. Increased knoWledge of the Trans-Mississippi 
area revived interest in Jefferson's earlier plan for removing 
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Indians west of the Mississippi where they would have a per­
manent home. The necessity for providing better defense for 
settlements east of Mississippi served as a justification for 
Andrew Jackson and others to insist upon immediate removal of 
the Indians. 
The political situation of the nation also weighed 
heavily upon Indian affairs. Monroe, during the so-called 
"Era of Good Feelings," tried to administer the government 
within the framework of a one-party system. At a time when 
sectional and factional stresses were increasing, Monroe 
found it difficult to achieve the harmony he so desperately 
sought. While westerners demanded Indian removal in order to 
promote "development," a vocal humanitarian interest, centered 
in the east, urged a more intensive effort to civilize the 
Indians and eventually incorporate them into American society. 
Ana~her important factor bearing on the Indian policy 
decisions of the Monroe administration was the states' rights 
problem. The Missouri struggle during this period brought 
the question of slavery to the political forefront and the 
south began its aggressive defense of state sovereignty. With 
regard to Indian affairs, southern states in particular 
(Georgia, Mississippi and Alabama) became increasingly insis­
tent upon their control over Indians within their boundaries. 
The thorniest problem for Monroe was the Georgia situation. 
In 1802, as part of the settlement of the Yazoo controversy, 
the Federal Government had signed a unique contract with 
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Georgia to the effect that the United States would extin­
guish Indian title to all land in Georgia as soon as it could 
'be done peacefully and on "reasonable terms.,,1 During the 
Monroe administrations Georgia availed itself of every oppor­
tunity to force federal officials to fulfill this contract. 
The condition of the Indian tribes east of the Miss­
issippi also added to a crisis situation facing the federal 
officials charged with managing Indian affairs. Philanthro­
pists were facing disturbing evidence that despite government 
and private efforts the Indians east of the Mississippi were 
not making an easy transition to civilization. The Indians 
were not changing their way of life, were not becoming white 
men; instead the natives seemed to be disintegrating before 
the very eyes of those who wished to save them. This appar­
ent failure of the civilization program, long a cherished 
project of government officials and the religious-benevolent 
community, caused many to reassess federal policy toward the 
Indians. 2 
These developments set the stage for are-evaluation 
of federal Indian policy by the Monroe administration. Monroe, 
l Annie Heloise Abel, "The History of Events ReSUlting 
in Indian Consolidation West of the Mississippi River," 
American Historical Association, Annual Report for the Year 
1806 (Washington, D.C., 1908), I, 32). 
2Bernard W. Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction. Jeffersonian 
Philanthropy and the American Indian (Chapel Hill. The Uni­
versity of North Carolina Press, 1973), p. 250. 
advised in the main by his Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun, 
was the first President actively to implement an Indian re­
moval policy. In his Inaugural Address Monroe showed no 
indication of his determination to make removal the founda­
tion of his Indian policy. He simply stated that it was the 
duty of the government to act with "kindness and liberality" 
towards the natives and to continue efforts to extend the 
benefits of civilization to the redmen. 1 In his First 
Annual Message Monroe gave a hint of his new program when he 
stated& 
The hunter state can exist only in the vast
 
uncultivated desert. It yields to the more
 
dense and compact form and greater force of
 
civilized population; and of right it ought
 
to yield. for the earth was given to mankind
 
to support the greatest number of which it is
 
capable. and no tribe or people have a right
 
to withhold from the wants of others more than 2
 
is necessary for their own support and comfort.
 
Monroe elaborated on this theme in his Second Annual Message, 
delivered November 16, 1818. Stating that "independent sav­
age communities can not long exist within the limits of a 
civilized population," Monroe argued that to civilize the 
Indians and to prevent their extinction it was "indispensable" 
that their independence cease and that the United States 
exercise "complete and undisputed" control over them. J 
Most authorities agree that Monroe's thinking on the 
lRichardson, II, p. 9. 
· ,2 Ib p. J1bid •• p. 46.----!.Q.. , 16. 
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"Indian problem" was molded at this time and throughout his 
two administrations by his diligent Secretary of War. John 
C. Calhoun. Indeed. it was probably Calhoun who deserves to 
be called the architect of the new federal Indian policy that 
took definite form by the mid 1820's. Although Calhoun was 
advised by his friends to turn down the offer to become 
Secretary of War under Monroe. he accepted and achieved not­
able success in that position. He reorganized the functions 
of the War Department. from the structure of the army to the 
handling of Indian affairs. 
It is probable that Monroe's statements on Indian 
affairs in his second Annual Message reflected the advise of 
Calhoun. The Secretary's studied recommendations on Indian 
policy were first made public in an eXhaustive report to 
Congress in December, 1818. In that report Calhoun urged that 
federal policy toward the India.ns "undergo an important change. II 
Rejecting the idea that the tribes were independent nations. 
Calhoun boldly stated that "0ur views of their interest, and 
not their own, ought to govern them." By a combination of 
force and persuasion, the tribes "ought to be brought within 
the pales of la.w and civilization." Calhoun predicted that 
if the tribes were left on their own they would be over­
whelmed by "the mighty torrent of our population. 1I1 
lU.S •• Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of 
War, December 8. 1818. House Do~. 25. 15th Cong., 2nd Sessa 
The proper course for the government, in Calhoun's 
judgment, was to start with the most advanced tribes, those 
surrounded by white population, and "contract their settle­
ments within reasonable bounds" but with the understanding 
that these reduced Indian settlements "are intended for their 
permanent homes." Indians within such settlements would then 
be given individual plots of land and the "idea of individual 
property in the soil carefully inculcated." In addition, 
and importantly, the government's program of education would 
be accelerated; schools would be established to teach Indian 
children the three R's and the "common arts of life." This 
new program was absolutely necessary, Calhoun concluded, be­
cause the Indians were decreasing and degenerating under the 
present policy. Those Indians who might choose not to submit 
to the new program could "be permitted and aided in forming 
new settlements at a distance from ours."l 
The meaning of Calhoun's recommendations was clear. 
Either the Indians would assimilate or they would have to be 
removed. The government, pressured by an uncontrollable west­
ward movement, could not wait for "time and experience" to 
effect the civilization of the Indians. Indians who rejected 
incorporation could pursue "the chase" in the wilderness west 
of the Mississippi. There the unredeemed Indians would be 
shielded from impending ruin. 
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Even though state authorities in the west and south, 
and most settlers on the frontier ridiculed government efforts 
to educate and civilize the Indians, the Monroe administra­
tion retained its commitment to this aspect of federal policy. 
In fact, increased government resources were devoted to the 
civilization program during the Monroe years. In the judgment 
of Monroe and Calhoun removal and education should go hand-in­
hand. In 1819 Congress passed a bill appropriating $10,000 
annually for the civilization of the Indians. It was 
Monroe's decision that this money should be spent "in aid of 
the efforts of societies. or individuals, who might feel dis­
posed to bestow their time and resources to effect the ob­
. t ,, 1Jec •••• By 1821 the government was supporting twenty-five 
Indian schools under the management of various religious 
groups. such as the American Board of Commissioners for 
,.., . •• 2
rorelgn MIsSIons. 
During Monroe's first term, Calhoun sought to negoti­
ate treaties with the Creeks and Cherokees for the purpose 
of obtaining cession of their lands within the State of 
Georgia. In line with his announced plan of 1818, Calhoun, 
in an effort to persuade the Indians to emigrate west of the 
Mississippi, granted individual allotments of land to those 
lU.S., Congress, House, Report of the secretary of 
War, January 17. 1820. House Doc. 46, 16th Cong., 1st Sessa 
2U•S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretan:: of 
War. January 22. 1822. House Doc. ~, 17th Cong .• 1st Sessa 
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Indians who wished to remain in their traditional home. The 
1819 treaty with the Cherokee obtained a significant land 
cession within Georgia, but the Georgians were not at all 
satisfied. They demanded a complete extinguishment of 
Indian title within the State. Georgians also objected vio­
lently to the government granting allotments to individual 
Indians. 
In deference to states' rights, Calhoun and Monroe 
began to play down their program to assimilate Indians within 
the boundaries of the states. At the same time they placed 
more emphasis on the removal of the tribes west of the 
Mississippi. Yet neither Monroe nor Calhoun advocated the 
use of force. In a report to Congress in 1824, Monroe ex­
plained that efforts to persuade the Cherokees to relinquish 
their Georgia lands had failed. He stated that in view of 
Cherokee refusal to exchange Georgia ]and for territory be­
yond the Mississippi "they Can be removed only by force" 
and "an attempt to remove them by force would, in my opinion, 
be unjust."l 
Monroe's strategy was to use persuasion and manipula­
tion. He and Calhoun hoped that the Indians could be educated 
to remove. Sooner or later the Indians would come to realize 
that their future "security and happiness" would be promoted 
by complete separation from the disturbing effects of a 
lRichardson, II, p. 235. 
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surrounding white population. 
This belief eventually caused trouble for Calhoun and 
Monroe. One of the goals of their policy was to free more 
Indian land east of the Mississippi for white settlement and 
they felt that educated Indians would realize the need to re­
move, or at least, to give up sizeable portions of their land. 
The results were exactly opposite. Educated Indians realized 
the value of the land and often gained economic control over 
tribal property. These men then became the tribal leaders 
who opposed removal. They not only wished to remain on their 
ancestral lands but developed a vested economic stake as 
well. Compounding the problem was the fact that Calhoun 
wished to first remove a tribe that had a high economic, 
political and social development. l He feltthis would be a 
good example to other Indian tribes. But, since he refused 
to use force to achieve removal, his policy was doomed to 
bog down in a mire of prolonged negotiations and ignored 
treaties. 
Adding to Calhoun's frustration was the failure of 
Congress to act on most of his proposals of reform in the 
area of Indian affairs. Immediately after taking office 
Calhoun recognized the inefficiency of the Indian office 
within the War Department. To compliment his removal and 
education efforts, he proposed a streamlining of the 
1 .'. , 6 DeROSIer, p. ~ • 
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Department. At this time Indian affairs were directed 
rather haphazardly by territorial governors, Indian agents 
and sub-agents, and the Office of Indian Trade. Calhoun, as 
Secretary of War, was charged to supervise this decentral­
ized network of government organization. In 1822, for 
example, there were three Superintendents of Indian Affairs 
in the field. Lewis Cass, as Governor of Michigan Territory, 
was Superintendent in that area. Governor James Miller had 
a similar responsibility in the Arkansas Territory. William 
Clark, with headquarters at St. Louis, was the other Super­
intendent with responsibility for managing the tribes west 
of the Mississippi. Each of these men had authority over 
Indian agents and SUb-agents within their jurisdictions. In 
1822 there were a total of 17 Indian agents and 25 sub-agents. 1 
These men had the job of managing relations between whites and 
Indians, and between the tribes themselves. They were to re­
port any violations of the Intercourse Acts by unlicensed tra­
ders and settlers. But they had no enforcement power and if 
violators were found, they had to turn to the army for help 
in SUbduing them. Only the military arm of the government had 
the power to enforce the regulatory laws. In the end, it was 
this force which was supposed to quiet unrest between the 
tribes or remove intruders from Indian land. In addition, 
l U•S., Congress, House, Re£ort of the Secretary of 
War, April 12, 1822, House Doc. 110, 17th Cong., 1st Sessa 
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there were the government-operated trading factories under 
the supervision of Thomas McKinney, chief of the Office of 
Indian Trade. These factories were independent of the other 
two agencies and Calhoun saw them as a method of bringing 
civilization to the tribes.! 
Calhoun wanted to center all Indian relations in a 
"superintendent of Indian affairs,·' who would be responsible 
to the Secretary of War. Besides controlling all ~gents, 
this superintendent would be in charge of Indian trade. He 
would license traders and a license was to cost from $100 to 
$500. Also all alcohol would be forbidden from Indian ter­
ritory and the trading factories would have to keep books 
showing the prices of goods which were bought, sold and 
kept. 2 
Calhoun also proposed to establish individual Indians 
on land of their own, and in this fashion encourage the idea 
of private ownership of the soil. Finally, he sought to use 
Indian annuity paYments to educate red children, and when 
these individuals were ready they would be granted citizen­
Ship.) 
However, this revamping of the Indian Office did not 
lCharles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun, Nationalist, 111Q­
1828, Vol. I (New York. Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1944), 
PP:-149-150. 
2 Ib · , p. 3Ibid ., p. 170.
..-.!.9.' , 169 • 
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take place. On April 3, 1822, the house "negatived" a resolu­
tion which would have directed the Standing Committee of 
Indian Affairs to inquire into the expediency of establish­
ing a new "Department of Indian Affairs."l Earlier in 
February, 1821 the Senate had indefinitely postponed consid­
ering a bill, which would have provided for better regulation 
of trade with the Indian tribes. 2 Congress, then, was con­
tent to sit on the issue at this time and Calhoun was left 
with only the trading factories through which to work. 
Unfortunately these were already in danger of failing. 
The factory system was under attack from all sides. The fac­
tories, themselves were designed to serve the Indians. The 
government hoped that by introducing goods among them, they 
could promote peace and civilization. In dealing fairly with 
the tribes it was hoped that the Indians would respect the 
federal government. Thomas L. McKenney was in charge of 
these factories and he was a great defender of them. McKenney 
stressed that the factories should introduce agricultural 
goods among the Indians. He felt that to make citizens out 
"J 
of them, they must first be anchored to the soil. J He also 
1AD!:!{\IS of the Con ress of the United states, 12th 
Congress, 1st Session Washington. Gales and Seaton, 1855), 
p. 1464. 
2Annals of Congress, 16th Congress, 2nd Session, 
February 2~, 18~ {Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1855)· 
3Clarence Edwin Carter (ed.), The !§rritorial Papers 
of the United States, Vol. XIX (Washington: u.s. Govern."llent 
Printing Office, 1953), p. 242. 
56
 
rejected the idea of' keeping the Indians constantly in debt 
and tried to impress upon them the importance of prompt pay­
1
ment. A true friend of the Indian, he sought to protect 
and civilize them through means of fair trade. This brought 
him into direct conflict with several groups. Frontiersmen 
in the south and west were distrustful of the factories 
feeling that they helped the Indians remain on much wanted 
land. Also, the powerful political voice of the American Fur 
Company was making itself heard in Congress in opposition to 
the factory system. The company did not like the fashion in 
which the factories attempted to monopolize Indian trade. By 
offering the Indians a fair price, the factories made 
much harder for these private traders to bargain. 2 
it 
Congress itself was becoming wary of the factories for 
the simple reaSon that they were losing money.3 In January, 
1822, Congress began to examine the expenditures of the fac­
tory system. The result of this was the passage of a bill 
to abolish that system. This was passed in May, 1822 with­
4
out too much difficulty in either house of Congress. Thus 
1Ib id., p. 105. 2Wiltse, p. 250. 
3Annals of Cqngress, 17th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 
1103-1104. A report of a select Congressional Committee as­
signed to study the problem concluded that the government had 
invested $290,000 in Indian trade since 1806. It was further 
decided that the government was losing much of this capitol. 
For example, the Committee cited a Choctaw factory that was 
owed $12,000. It was felt that only one-third of these debts 
would ever be collected, while at Fort Chicago it was decided 
that the loss to the government in goods, alone was over 
;~6,900. 
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ended the program by which Calhoun had hoped to civilize and 
preserve the Indians. Gone was his opportunity to make the 
Indians economically dependent on the government and also 
his opportunity to introduce the arts of agriculture to the 
tribes. This would have to be done mainly by missionaries 
and private organizations. 
This defeat was not really as serious as it looked; 
while the factory system provided some help, on the whole it 
was failing. This was mainly due to the inability of the 
government to enforce the licensing and restrictions on 
traders within Indian country. The superintendents and 
agents were charged with enforcing the Intercourse Acts. 
But they were given no coercive power and had to apply to 
the army for help. This was a lengthy process at best. The 
forts and troops which had to be squeezed from a "c ivilian­
minded, economy-conscious Congress" were inadequate. 1 Adding 
to the problems was the fact that Congress reduced the size 
of the army from 10,000 to 6,000 in 1821. In addition many 
officers were sensitive about taking orders from the civilian 
agents and often were tardy in answering requests for assist­
2
ance. 
1Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the 
Formative Years I The Indian Trade and the Intercourse Acts, 
1790-1834 (Cambridgel Harvard University Press, 19b2),-P:-62. 
2 Ibid ., p. 64. 
-----------------_..'­
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This resulted in unrestrained violations of the Inter­
course Act. As early in Monroe's administration as May, 
1817, Daniel Hughes, an agent at Fort Hawkins, Georgia, re­
ported that government silence on reports of violations of 
the laws regulating commerce had encouraged additional adven­
turers to embark on Indian trade. Hughes reported that fort 
sutlers, with the post commander's permission, were also en­
gaging in illegal trade. 1 
Earlier that year William Bowen, the assistant factor 
at Fort Hawkins, had written to Hughes complaining of smug­
glers in the Creek nation. Operating with impunity, these 
men were selling the Creeks cheap goods and defrauding them. 
Th ' was creat"lng mlS t rus·t and SUspicion. 2·lS	 .. 
In December of 1817 Hughes reported that one man had 
become bold enough to open an extensive store in the heart of 
the Creek country, and that this man would soon have all of 
an $85,000 annuity which the Creeks had just received.) 
Enforcement of the Intercourse Acts was non-existant 
and the situation was so bad that by the middle of 1818 David 
B. Mitchell, an Indian agent at Fort Mitchell, Alabama, had 
given	 up any hope of civilizing the Indians unless private 
4traders were restrained from selling liquor to them. 
lCarter, XVIII, pp. 279-280. 
2 Ibid ., p. 49. )Ibid., p. 282. 
4 I bid ., p. 352. 
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After all this, McKenney was forced to write Calhoun 
in July, 1818 and admit that the factories weren't working. 
He told the Secretary of War that illegal traders were so 
numerous they bought Indian goods before the Indians could 
reach the factory. McKenney admitted that he had checked 
some of this by hiring "honest" Americans to go among the 
Indians, but he had not eliminated all the private traders. 1 
Evidence of this was seen in the summer of 1814 when 
John Fowler, a factor in the Arkansas Territory, reported 
from the Cherokee lands that traders had an established route 
which they traveled through the reservation, selling Whiskey 
to the Indians. 2 Two weeks later Fowler reported that even 
the Cherokee were complaining of whites selling liquor in 
villages. He asserted that the Indians were given no pro­
tection Whatsoever against this intrusion and that they were 
eventually robbed of everything of value which they owned. 
Fowler blamed existing practices for allowing easy access to 
the Indian country to some of the worst characters on the 
frontier. The agent then voiced another complaint. He said 
that it was extremely difficult to obtain legal proof against 
traders. Apparently witnesses risked life and limb by giving 
evidence against these men.) 
lEdwin W. Hemphill (ed.), The Papers of John C. Calhoun, 
1812-1818, Vol. II (Columbia, South Carolinas University of 
South Carolina Press, 1963), p. 39). 
? ~Carter, XIX, p. 76. 3Ibid ., p. 75. 
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Worse yet, if evidence could be found the local civil 
t - - ­
authorities often wouldn't prosecute. Russel B. Hyde, an 
agent in the Arkansas Territory, complained in 182) that the 
u.s. Attorney had refused to prosecute persons for trapping 
and hunting on Indian lands. He also revealed the startling 
fact that one-half of the residents of the area were engaged 
in illegal trade with the Indians. Hyde lamented that in 
order to try the violators, he would have to send them to 
1Mississippi or Louisiana and he couldn't spare the men. En­
forcement of the Intercourse Acts thus seems to have been 
impossible. Francis Prucha noted that if a violator was 
somehow brought to trial, the chances were that the jUdges 
would dismiss the case on a technicality or the jury would 
side with the defendant. 2 
These complaints tend to support the idea that the fac­
tory system was not working effectively to control trade with 
the Indians. It failed to make the Indians dependent on the 
government or to provide a method for introducing the arts of 
civilization. McKenney felt strongly that through trade the 
country had a chance to solve its Indian problem, but he 
realized that if the system regulating trade wasn't strength­
ened, it would not work. He struggled hard to improve the 
1Carter, XX, p. 12J. 
2Prucha, p. 71. 
controls on trade. but when Congress did not respond. he 
could see the system was doomed by the growth of private 
trade. 
The importance of the abolition of the factory system 
should not be over-emphasized. The Secretary of War still 
retained the power to license traders, although his power to 
restrain illegal trade remained limited. The demise of the 
factory system reflected the failure of the Monroe adminis­
tration to achieve a positive result in one very important 
area of its Indian policy. The frontier was too extensive 
and the ambition of the traders too overWhelming to permit 
effective federal control over white-red contacts. Unable 
to protect the Indians, the government gradually came to the 
conclusion that removal was the only way to prevent the 
annihilation of the tribes. 
The failure to protect the Indians did not end with 
the encroachment of unlicensed traders. Early in Monroe's 
administration there was evidence that many white settlers 
were on Indian lands. In 1817. while directing surveying 
operations in Alabama. William Borne described land which 
had recently been ceded by the Indians. He noted that al­
though unsold and unsurveyed, the lands were by no means 
destitute of population. He described some of the districts 
as being widely settled by an extensive white population; he 
concluded that the time for removing intruders was long 
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past. l 
In April of 1818 Governor Lewis Cass of the Michigan 
Territory suggested that it would be advisable for the govern­
ment to extinguish Indian title in the vicinity of Green Bay. 
This was because there were considerable white settlements 
h · h h db' . t f . 2there, w ~c a een ~n eX1S ence or over thlrty years. 
It was obvious that by this time the government could not stop 
the flow of white farmers onto desirable Indian lands. 
The great tide of white settlement towards the Indian 
lands had begun after the War of 1812 hgd removed the British 
influence from the Northwest and Southwest. By 1820, this 
white pressure was beginning to be felt by the Indians of the 
north and south. The demands for extinguishing Indian title 
waS growing daily. Calhoun was under great pressure and did 
try to persuade the tribes to remove throughout the Monroe 
years. In 1817 a treaty was signed with the Cherokees with 
removal as its goal, and some of this tribe actually did move 
west of the Mississippi. Again and again Calhoun approached 
the tribes, and in 1821 did obtain a removal agreement with 
the Choctaw. However the Indians, especially the southern 
tribes, matured to the point of not ceding another foot of 
their land, and Calhoun's efforts were in vain. 
As a result the condition of the tribes began to 
1Carter, XVIII, p. 70. 
2Carter, XVII, p. 582. 
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deteriorate, the settlers began to complain and Indian policy 
would soon become a national political issue. Frontier in­
terests, some missionaries among the Redmen, and many cabinet 
officials began to urge immediate removal, while easterners 
and the majority of missionaries urged strict protection of 
Indian rights. 
Failing to convince the tribes that removal was im­
perative and being patient enough to wait until they de­
sired to remove, Calhoun pushed his program of Indian educa­
tion. In 1822 he reported on the progress of education 
efforts, and announced that $15,000 'had been expended at 
eleven Indian schools. These schools were required to teach 
the 3 R's, and agriCUltural, manufacturing and domestic 
skillse So far, he contended, experience had justified the 
expenditures. He could not call it a success, however. 
Calhoun said that only time would tell if the system would 
bring the Indian into civilization. He felt that before the 
efforts could have an impact the present generation would have 
to pass away. He also repeated his criticism of treating 
the tribes as independent nations and felt that in order to 
preserve them, the jurisdiction of the United States should 
be extended over them. Prior to this, however, Calhoun felt 
the system of education must be put into extensive and active 
operation) 
lA.nnals of Congress, 17th Congress, 1st Session, p. 984. 
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Again, the Secretary of War was hoping that education 
would show the Indians that they should remove. Later de­
velopments would prove this policy to be unrealistic. Calhoun 
was well aware of white pressure upon the Indians and of the 
inability of the government to arrest it. He did not realize 
that the Indians would not be given a generation to achieve 
education and civilization. 
Congress was also failing to keep up with new problems 
facing the Indians. As early as 1818 William Clark, Indian 
superintendent at St. Louis, had complained that he lacked 
the funds to impress upon the Indians (by use of presents and 
trade goods) that the policy of the U.S. government towards 
them was directed towards peace and tranquility. He expressed 
his absolute inability to manage these "wild people" in such 
a way as to prevent trouble and discontent. 1 
In spite of this Congress reduced the budget of the 
Indian department from $200,000 to $100,000 in March, 1821. 
Calhoun reacted by curtailing all expenditures other than pay­
ment of employees, transportation and annuities to the 
Indians. Any other activities concerning Indians would have 
to be financed by special congressional appropriations. This 
seriously hindered any other activities by the bureau. This 
action of Congress is somewhat difficult to understand. It 
shows that Congress was more worried about balancing a bUdget 
lXemphill, p. 306. 
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and reducing the size of the army than the plight of the 
Indian. Yet, the President, the War Department and Congress 
were aware of what the Indian's fate would be, if some posi­
tive program was not started. In 1824, James Monroe told 
Congress that the Indians, surrcrunded by a white population, 
could not maintain order among themselves and would soon be 
annihilated. He suggested that all of this could be avoided 
if the tribes would remove. 1 Calhoun 
, 
had told Congress in 
1822 that an Indian tribe surrounded by whites was destined 
to remain unhappy and uncivilized. He said that Indians in 
this condition lost their lofty spirits and heroic courage 
and dwindled away.2 Concerned Congressmen began to describe 
the fate of the Indians. In 1825, while a removal bill was 
being considered, Senator John Eliot of Georgia made a pas­
sionate plea for Indian removal. He pointed out that the 
decline of the Indians was a result of their location and 
urged that they be moved beyond the eroding white population 
before they disappeared.) Although Eliot and his state had 
a great deal to gain from removal, he was familiar enough 
with the aggressive habits of frontier whites to know that 
1Messages, II, p. 805. 
2Annals of Congress, 17th Congress, 1st Session, p. 986. 
JReg+ster of Debates in Congress, Eighteenth Congress, 
Second Sess1on-TWashingtons lJales and Seaton, 1825), p. 634. 
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what he said was true. Despite this, the bill was eventual­
ly lost in the House and although the a,forementioned removal 
efforts did take place, no organized operation could begin. 
This disorganization played an important role in the 
p' early failure of removal. Very early in Monroe's administra­
tion Andrew Jackson had forced the Choctaw to sign a removal 
treaty. The Indians later repudiated the treaty, but what was 
more interesting was the fact that Jackson had granted the 
Choctaw land within the organized limits of the Territory of 
Arkansas. By 1820 Governor James Miller was begging that the 
senate not approve the treaty. He pointed out that it would 
be necessary to depopUlate two entire counties in Arkansas. 
He indicated that one third of the entire white population of 
the terri tory lived within the Choctaw cession.! In the same 
year the territorial assembly of Arkansas petitioned the 
President not to make their terri tory I'the receptacle for 
this unfortunate race of people." 2 This opposition to re­
moval by whites who were west of the Mississippi would later 
contribute to bringing the operation to a halt. It was de­
finitely a mistake to attempt to enforce this treaty, because 
an object of removal was to withdraw the Indians from the 
limits of the states and territories. 
This mistake and a small amount of voluntary removal 
by the Cherokee were the only successes which Calhoun and 
2Ibid ., pp. 14J-144.lCarter, XIX, p. 245. 
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Monroe had in pursuing this policy. In spite of this appar­
ent failure, these two men did lay an important and neces­
sary foundation upon which the removal policy could be built. 
Monroe stated the basic principles and beliefs, which would 
soon become the standard defenses for removal. Calhoun 
transformed these beliefs into a program, which approached 
the Indian problem in a systematic way. The program operated 
in four basic areas. The basic goal was to remove those 
Indians who were not wise in the arts of civilization. Also, 
education was to play an increasing role in Calhoun's pro­
gram. This was to aid in both removal and in advancement in 
civilization. In addition, Calhoun wanted an improvement in 
the Indian Affairs Bureau itself, and hoped this would in­
crease the effectiveness of Indian administration. The 
final part of Calhoun's program was the most important. He 
called for the end of treating Indian tribes as independent 
nations and urged that they be brought under the jurisdiction 
and the laws of the United states. He wanted to legislate 
for the Indians and not treat with them. This denial that 
Indian tribes were independent nations later became an impor­
tant factor in the success of removal. Calhoun realized that 
Indian power had been broken by the War of 1812. With their 
military strength shattered the tribes were helpless against 
the tide of white settlers which swept onto their lands. They 
needed some protection, and Calhoun felt the United States 
should provide this. 
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This program was never fulfilled during Calhoun's 
tenure. Instead, Congress harshly undermined the existing 
policy by cutting funds and troops, and eliminating the fac­
tory system. Federal officials continued to promise the 
Indians protection on their reserves, but it was obvious that 
the government could not prevent white intrusion. The re­
sult was that the Indians lost faith in the pledges of the 
United States, the frontier settlers lost patience and grew 
angry, and the government became bogged down with conflict as 
far as the Indians were concerned. More importantly, as de­
mands for removal became more commonplace, Indian policy be­
gan emerging as a national political issue. 
Chapter 5 
THE END OF MODERATION 
John Quincy Adams became President at a time when 
American Indian policy could have gone in either one of two 
directions. Adams inherited from the Monroe administration 
an Indian policy that stressed removal by persuasion, edu­
cation and manipulation. By 1825 a significant number of 
philanthropic organizations had accepted removal as a neces­
sary element in the civilization program. Their argument was 
that removal of the tribes west of the Mississippi would pro­
vide sufficient time for the incorporation of the Indians be­
fore they disintegrated in the face of the frontier advance. 1 
As stated earlier, Monroe, Calhoun and McKenney wanted such 
removal to be voluntary. Adams could continue this policy or 
he could respond to the pressure of state authorities and the 
frontier "border-spirit" by adopting a hard-line policy that 
would remove the Indians by force. The President from New 
England decided to continue, in most essentials, the Monroe­
Calhoun policy of moderation. Adams failed to accomplish the 
goals of such a policy. During his administration most of the 
lBernard W. Sheehan, Seeds of Extinctions Jeffersonian 
Philanthropy and the American Indianrchapel Hills The Uni­
versity of Nortn Carolina Press, 1973), pp. 242-243· 
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tribes east of the Mississippi continued to disintegrate. 
the southern tribes became more nationalistic. the Georgia 
problem led to a show-down between state sovereignty and 
federal authority. and as a result by the end of Adams' four 
years in office U.S.-Indian relations had reached a dramatic 
crisis point. 
Adams appointed James Barbour of Virginia as Secretary 
of War and it was left to Barbour to implement the adminis­
tration's Indian policy. although Thomas McKenney. as head of 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs. played a key role in most deci­
sion making. 
Secretary of War Barbour offered his jUdgments on the 
state of U.S.-Indian relations and his recommendations for a 
solution of the problems in an exhaustive report to the Com­
mittee on Indian Affairs of the House of Representatives on 
February 3. 1826. This report revealed clearly the growing 
sense of desperation felt by federal officials as they con­
fronted the dilemma inherent in the management of Indian 
affairs during the mid 1820's. 
Barbour began his report with historical reflections. 
Noting that previous attempts by the government to solve the 
conflicts between Indians and whites had failed. Barbour 
jUdged that "the future is not more cheering, unless resort 
be speedily had to other councils than those by which we have 
heretofore been governed." He acknowledged tha.t "one master 
passion ••• that of acquiring land .•• " had driven the white 
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man on the Indian and that the latter, yielding to a force 
he could not resist, had constantly retreated and wasted 
away until "a wretched fragment only survives ••• whose por­
tion is to brood in grief over their past misfortunes or to 
look in despair on the approaching catastrophe of their im­
pending doom."l 
He then asked "a most solemn questionl" "shall we go 
on quietly in a course, which, jUdging from the past, threat­
ens their extinction, while their past sUfferings and future 
prospects, so pathetically appeal to our compassion?" Barbour, 
reflecting the prevailing mood of both humanitarians associ­
ated with the benevolent movement and federal officialdom, 
. .	 asserted that the "character of a nation" was at stake. The 
United States must "give an example of the triumph of liberal 
principles" and save the Indians from destruction. 2 
The Secretary paid tribute to earlier governmental ef­
forts to civilize the Indians out of a "spirit of benevolence," 
but then went to explain the failure of those efforts because 
of the insatiable land hunger of frontiersmen. He admitted 
that the United States had broken treaties and sacrificed the 
happiness of the Indians to the acquisition of new lands. The 
Indians "emphatically ask us," Barbour continued, "what new 
l U•S ., Congress, House of Representative~, James 
Barbour to John Cocke, February), 1826, Executlv~ Doc. 102, 
19th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5. 
2 . d 6Ibl ..• , p •.• 
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pledges can you give us that we shall not again be exiled 
when it is your wish to possess these lands?"l 
Having presented this poignant analysis Barbour pro­
ceeded to outline a removal plan that would hopefully remedy 
the defects in the Monroe-Calhoun program. Barbour's scheme 
involved five essential elements. First, the government 
should set aside as an "exclusive abode" for the Indians the 
country west of the Mississippi, and beyond the states and 
territories, "and so much on the East of the Mississippi as 
lies West of Lake Huron and Michigan •••• " Second, the 
Indians should be removed to those areas as individuals, "in 
contradistinction to tribes." Third, the government should 
set up a territory, similar in Organization to the territories 
established since the Northwest Ordinance, in the designated 
area. Initially that Indian territory would be governed by 
a Governor, three Judges and a Secretary, all appointed by 
the President. The Indians could have their own legislative 
body "as soon as the civilization of the Indians would admit 
of it." Fourth, when circumstances should justify it, govern­
ment policy should be directed toward "the extinction of the 
tribes, and their amalgamation into one mass, and a distri­
bution of property among the individuals." Fifth, those 
Indians who might choose not to remove would remain in their 
present location in an "unal tared" condition. It was Barbour's 
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judgment that these "must soon surrender their distinction 
of race for the resemblance of the white man. If He meant, of 
course, that this group of Indians would have to become sub­
ject to the control of the states within those boundaries 
they remained. 1 
The foregoing recommendations Barbour presented in 
the form of a bill "for the preservation and civilization of 
the Indian Tribes within the United States." In appealing 
for its passage Barbour stressed that "the end proposed is 
the happiness of the Indians--the instrument of its accom­
plishment--their progressive, and finally, their complete 
. '1' , ,,2C1Vl lzatlon. Barbour's plan differed from the Monroe-
Calhoun scheme in one important aspect. Monroe and Calhoun 
had failed to persuade the chiefs of the Cherokees and other 
southern tribes to remove voluntarily. Barbour's plan would 
permit individuals within those tribes who wanted to remove 
to do so on their own volition. This could be arranged by 
negotiating a treaty with just that faction of the Indian tribe 
which agreed to emigrate. The obdurate chiefs, such as John 
Ross of the Cherokees, could be by-passed. 
In the main, however, Barbour'S plan for removal con­
tinued the principles followed by the Monroe administration. 
As :barbour emphasized in his report, tithe leading principle 
of the bill ••• is that nothing is proposed to be done •••• 
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withou,1 their own consent.'1 
President Adams approved this plan, but the bill 
which would have implemented it failed to pass in Congress. 
As a result Adams'and Barbour's only attempt to establish an 
innovative system for dealing with the Indians was destroyed. 1 
However, Congress did give the administration a chance to 
act in the same year. On May 9, 1826 the legislators passed 
a law liTo Enable the President of the United States to Hold 
a Treaty With the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations." This bill 
appropriated the funds necessary for the federal government 
to send commissioners to meet with these tribes and purchase 
more land in Mississippi. 2 It gave Adams a chance to 
approach some of the tribes about removal and also gave him 
the chance to quiet western impatience by obtaining some 
concessions from the Indians. This was not to be. Negotia­
tions with the two tribes bogged down and eventually failed. 
Many citizens of Mississippi, who had expected much new land 
to be opened for settlement, became enraged, and the opposi­
tion to moderated Indian removal began to solidify and become 
vocal. At the very least, these people wanted a thorough re­
examination of the gover~~ent's methods of handling the Indian 
problem. 
lFrancis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the 
Formative Years I The Indian Trade and the ~ntercourse Acts, 
1290-18J4 (Cambridgel Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 
230-231. 
2Arthur H. DeRosier, Jr., The Removal of the Choctaw 
Indians (Knoxvillel University of Tennessee Press, 1970), pp. 
90-91 . 
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Representative William Haile of Mississippi called a 
meeting of representatives from all the southern states to 
discuss the problem and to develop a unified Indian policy. 
This 1827 meeting was attended by representatives from North 
Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, Alabama and Mississippi. 
These men adopted a resolution calling for total Indian re­
moval and felt that the passage of state laws abolishing 
tribal governments would be the most effective method of 
achieving this in light of the government's refusal to use 
force to accomplish the goal. 1 The policy of voluntary re­
moval was coming under fire from an organized opposition that 
offered an alternate solution to the problem. Most of the 
opposition came from southern states with rapidly increasing 
white populations and great portions of territory under 
Indian title. 
The absence of South Carolina from the meeting stands 
out. South Carolina no longer had an Indian problem, since 
the state had extinguished tribal titles within her bounds 
by conquest after the Revolution. Political representatives 
from South Carolina and many of the northern states were less 
likely to advocate forced removal. Indeed, they often sided 
with such spokesmen for Indian rights as Theodore Frelinghuysen 
and Daniel Webster. 
With tensions increasing President Adams took a stand 
lDeRosier, p. 93. 
76 
in 1825 that intensified the dispute over Indian policy. In 
February it came to his attention that the Treaty of Indian 
Springs, negotiated with the Creek nation in December, 1824 
and ratified in January, 1825, had touched off an explosion. 
The treaty, calling for a major cession of land .by the Creeks 
in the State of Georgia, had been signed on the Indian side 
by a faction of the Creek tribe led by William McIntosh, a 
chief with a long history of cooperation with the whites and 
Georgia officials. After ratification of the treaty McIntosh 
was assassinated by agents of the Creek faction opposed to the 
cession of land to the United States. Virtual civil war 
broke out in the Creek nation over the issue. Adams was faced 
with the majority of the Creek nation refusing to abide by 
the terms of the treaty. After consultation with Barbour, 
Adams decided to disregard the treaty and negotiated a new 
treaty more satisfactory to the majority of the Creeks, 
This was the Treaty of Washington, signed January 24, 1826. 
The new treaty obtained a large cession of land from the 
Creeks in the State of Georgia, but not all Creek land in the 
state as was the provision of the earlier treaty. Adams and 
Barbour felt justified in setting aside the first treaty be­
cause they obtained proof that it had been signed by a minor­
ity of the Creek nation. Barbour, who signed the Treaty of 
Washington for the government, explained that the United 
States "was unwilling that any cessions of land should be 
made to them, unless with the fair understanding and full 
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assent of the Tribe making such cession •••• "l 
In the aftermath of this decision the Georgia officials 
objected violently. Governor George M. Troup of Georgia. who 
had earlier bribed McIntosh to sign the Treaty of Indian 
Springs. refused to recognize the validity of the Treaty of 
Washington. Instead. he sent in Georgia surveyors to survey 
all the land ceded by the Creeks in the Treaty of Indian 
Springs. Then President Adams contemplated ordering federal 
marshalls to Georgia to arrest the surveyors as trespassers 
on Indian land. A serious confrontation developed between 
the President and the State of Georgia that came close to in­
volving a military conflict between federal authorities and 
state mi.litia. Troup .would back up his surveyors with the 
militia. To this challenge President Adams responded cau­
tiously. He decided against using federal military force to 
apprehend the trespassers because lIif the military force of 
the Union should have been employed to enforce its violated 
law, a conflict must have ensued. which would itself have in­
flicted a wound upon the Union and presented the aspect of 
2 
one of these confederated States at war with the rest." 
Adams solution was merely to instruct the u.s. Attorney and 
marshall in the District of Georgia to commence prosecution 
lU.S •• Congress, House of Representatives, Treaty of 
Washington. House Doc. 165, 19th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5· 
2Richardson, II. p. 372 • 
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against the surveyors. But Adams did issue a threat to the 
State of Georgiaa 
... it is my duty to say that if the legislative
and executive authorities of the State of Georgia 
should persevere in acts of encroachment upon 
the territories secured by a solemn treaty to the 
Indians, and the laws of the Union remain unaltered, 
a superadded obligation even higher than that of 
human authority will compel the Executive of the 
United States to enforce the laws and fulfill the 
duties of the nation by all the force committed1for that purpose to his charge. 
The State of Georgia eventually forced the federal 
government to negotiate for the complete relinquishment of 
all Creek land within the state. Governor Troup had declareda 
"the harmony and tranquility of the two governments, so much 
to be cherished by all good men, can never be maintained un­
interruptedly until those Indians shall have been removed. 1I2 
They were removed. A treaty signed in November, 1826 by 
Thomas McKenney (with a supplementary article added by Agent 
John Crowell on January 3. 1828) embraced a cession by the 
Creek nation of all the remnant of their lands within the 
State of Georgia. The result of this confrontation was turn­
ing point in Indian affairs, with the federal government 
bowing to the demands of a state. The federal retreat had, 
moreover, been approved by Congress. In March, 1827, a 
l Ibid ., p. 373. 
2U•S ., Congress, House of Representatives, Message of 
Governor George M. Troup, November 7, 1826, House Doq. 22, 
19th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 7. 
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select committee in Congress appointed to consider the dis­
agreement between President Adams and the State of Georgia 
~..J l 
had resolved that lithe law of the land, as set forth in the 
Treaty of Washington, ought to be maintained by all necessary 
constitutional and legal means,1I but accompanied this with a 
resolution urging the President to procure a cession of the 
remaining Creek land in Georgia. 1 Rather than enforce the 
Treaty of Washington, President Adams preferred to negotiate 
another treaty. It was a grim omen for the Indians. 
Meanwhile, Adams and Barbour were brought face-to-face 
with the even thornier problem involving the Cherokees in 
the state of Georgia. The Cherokee, described in 1825 by 
McKenney as "a civilized people," were appealing to Adams to 
protect them against the State of Georgia. Since the end of 
the War of 1812 and particularly since 1820, Georgia had 
applied increasing pressure upon the federal government to 
fulfill the terms of the Compact of 1802 and extinguish all 
Indian land titles in that state. In 1825 the Cherokee nation 
numbered 15,000, including 200 whites living within the nation 
and over 1000 slaves. Two-thirds of the Cherokees then lived 
2
within the statutory limits of Georgia. Without question 
the Cherokees had advanced farther toward II c ivilization" than 
l U•S ., Congress, House of Representatives, House Re­
port 2£, 19th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 22. 
? ~U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Executive 
Doc. 102, 19th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 18. 
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any other tribe within the United States. Led by progressive 
chiefs, many of whom were mixed bloods, between 1819 and 
1827 the Cherokees had made a supreme effort to forestall the 
removal of their people from the ancestral lands. They re­
placed ancient tribal culture with that of the educated and 
Christianized white man and they converted tribal government 
into a republic patterned after that of the United States. 1 
It was clear at the beginning of Adams' administration 
that the Cherokees would not voluntarily emigrate west of the 
Mississippi. Early in 1825 a delegation of Cherokee chiefs 
told President Adams that "no inducement can ever prompt 
them to abandon their habitations for a distant, wild, and 
strange clime" and that "they cannot consent to yield another 
foot of land.,,2 The chiefs acknowledged that removal might 
contribute to the betterment of primitive tribes, 
But if Indian civilization and preservation is 
sincerely desired, and is considered worthy the 
serious attention of the United states, never 
urge the remov~l of those tribes, who are now suc­
cessfully embracing the habits of civilized man 
within their own limits. A removal of the 
Cherokees can never be effected with their con­
sent; consequently, if removed at all, it must be 
effected by such means as would engender irrecon­
cilable prejudices, and their depression and Jultimate extinction would inevitably follow. 
lGrace Steele Woodward, The Cherokees (Normans Uni­
versity of Oklahoma Press. 1969~P. 139. 
2U•S ., Congress. House of Representatives, Report and 
, . Resolutions of the Legislature of Georgia, House Doc. 22, 
19th Cong., 2nd Sess •• p. 18J. 
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Georgia officials, in response to cultural advance­
ments made by the Cherokees, intensified efforts to force 
federal authorities to secure the removal of the Cherokees. 
Resolutions presented to Congress by the Georgia legislature 
in 1827 contained charges that the federal government had 
"palpably violated" the contract of 1802 by failing to ob­
tain a cession of all Cherokee lands in Georgia; that U.S. 
policy towards the Cherokees "has not been in good faith to­
ward Georgia;" that "Georgia has the right to extend her 
authority and laws over the whole territory, and to coerce 
obedience to them from all descriptions of people, be they 
white, red, black, who reside within her limits." After re­
peating the demand for federal action to remove the Cherokees, 
the Georgia legislators asserted they would "not attempt to 
enforce ••• rights by violence, until all other means of re­
dress fail.,,1 
Georgia's threats were in part provoked at this time 
by the recent action of the Cherokees in adopting a written 
constitution for the nation. The constitution was similar to 
that of the United States and asserted Cherokee sovereignty 
over their lands. The Secretary of War, James Barbour, 
warned the tribe, through their Indian agent, that the 
Cherokee constitution did not change relations between the 
l U•S ., Congress, Senate, Resolutions of the Legisla­
ture of Georgia, Senate Doc.80, 20th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 12. 
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United States and that tribe. The Cherokees replied that in 
their view the constitution "was adopted with no view to set 
up an independence unwarranted by the treaties with the 
United States." On the contrary, they would "expect the pro­
tection of the United States in good faith, in supporting 
such rights as are secured to the Cherokee nation by our 
treaties."l 
Georgia officials took a different view. In their 
judgment the framing of the Cherokee constitution represented 
an attempt to establish a government independent of Georgia 
"inconsistent with the rights of the said State, and there­
fore not recognized by this government, and ought to be de­
cidedly discountenanced by the general government." 2 
A crisis had come. The federal government was faced 
with either violating agreements with the Indians or violat­
ing the Compact of 1802 with Georgia. The scheme to achieve 
removal of the Indians by persuasion was not succeeding as 
hoped by federal officials since the early days of the Monroe 
administration. The Indians would simply not emigrate vol­
untarily. 
The Cherokees were not the only Indians east of 
Mississippi who refused to emigrate. The Choctaws in 
lU.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Letter from 
the Secretary of War, House Doc. 106, 20th Cong., 1st Sess., 
p.	 22. 
2senate Doc. 80, 20th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 12. 
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Mississippi declared to Barbour in early 1826 that "we have 
come to a resolution that !.§l will ~el! !lQ. more ~ .QU ~ny 
H1terms. Similar resistance to removal was shown by the 
Chickasaws. Replying to the "talk" made by commissioners 
sent to negotiate a removal treaty with the Chickasaws in 
1826, Chickasaw chief Martin Colbert stated. 
We find it is the wish of our father to exchange 
lands with us, lying on the West side of the 
Mississippi river, which we are very sorry to 
hear, as we never had a thought of exchanging 
our land for any other, as we think that we would 
not find a country that would suit us as well as 
this we now occupy; it being the land of our 
forefathers, if we should exchange our lands for 
any other, fearing the consequences may be similar 
to transplanting an old tree, whiqh would wither 
and die away, and we are fearful we would come to 
the same; we want you, our brethren, to take our 2 
talk; we have no lands to exchange for any other •••• 
Thomas McKenney, head of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 
the War Department and the most important government agent 
during these years involved in negotiations with the Indian 
tribes, was exasperated by the Indians' refusal to emigrate. 
McKenney felt that Indian opposition to the removal policy of 
the government was due to the interference of white men and 
civilized mixed bloods living with the Indian nations.) 
lU.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Choctaw
 
Chiefs to James Barbour, March 18, 1826, House Doc. 12, 19th
 
Congo, 2nd Sess., p. 7·
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Senate Doc 0 21, 19th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. )2.
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" 
" . 
McKenney argued that the "great body" of Indians, if left to 
themselves, would cooperate with the government. He advocat­
ed that government policy be changed so as to provide "power 
that shall cause these interested People to cease their in­
terfering agencies." Specifically McKenney urged that the 
government make it clear to the Indians that the United 
States' "determination is final. 1I He suggested that the 
government tell the Indians "they must gQ and enjoy it" 
since removal was "intended wholly to benefit their condi­
tiono"l 
To avoid the meddling of the lIenlightened half-
breeds," McKenney thought it would be necessary to give them 
"liberal portions" of land within ceded areas. These indi­
vidual allotments would serve as a means of convincing the 
2half-breeds to support removal of the rest of the tribe.
This suggestion was put to good use by the Jackson adminis­
tration in the 1830'S and proved to be a necessary condition 
of all successful removal negotiations. 
While Barbour, McKenney and numerous treaty commis­
sioners attempted in vain to implement voluntary removal, 
Congress was beginning to feel the pressure of the growing 
crisis in Indian affairs. In April, 1828, a routine bill, 
2UoSo , Congress, House of Representatives, Thomas L. 
McKenney to James Barbour, December 27, 1826, House Doc. 28, 
19th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 6. 
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designed to defray the expenses of Choctaw and Chickasaw 
delegations sent to explore lands of the Mississippi, was 
introduced in the Senate and caused an unexpected debate. 
Thomas Hart Benton, of Missouri, used the occasion to dis­
cuss the merits of removal. He called it safe and humane, 
and pointed out that it would end the threat of Indian war 
in the frontier states. Thomas Cobb of Georgia offered an 
amendment calling for the inclusion of the Creeks and 
Cherokee tribes within the provisions of the bill. Cobb saw 
an opportunity to speed up or at least get removal efforts 
started again with respect to those tribes. The amendment, 
however, was objected to by Powhaton Ellis of Mississippi on 
the grounds that the Creeks and Cherokees had expressed firm 
opposition to removal. The debate then moved away from the 
subject of Indian explorations of western territory and to­
wards the general issue of removal. At this point Richard M. 
Johnson of Kentucky sought to bring the question back to 
focus, and indicated that the bill before the Senate was de­
signed only to 
enable the President to appoint agents to con­
duct a small number of chiefs, or other influ­
ential men of these nations, to a new country 
west of the Mississippi, to examine it for them­
selves, and bring back to the various tribes a 
correct account of all the a~vantages and dis­
advantages of the situation. 
lRegister of Debates in Con~ress, 20th Cong., 1st 
Q
, . 
.... ess. , Vol. IV (Washingtonl Gales and Seaton, 1828), p. 661. 
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Johnson could not understand why the bill should be limited 
to just two tribes and urged that the bill be made general. 
He indicated that helping the Indians voluntarily look for a 
new home was "magnanimous and honorable." The Senator con-
eluded by pointing to the advancement of the southern tribes 
toward civilization. William Rikin of Alabama disputed this 
contention and offered the opinion that wild Indians in the 
woods were more noble than half-civilized Indians who so 
often contracted the vices of the lower class whites. Cobb's 
amendment was adopted and the Senate went on record as favor­
ing the expenditure of money to sponsor exploratory journeys 
to the west by all four tribes. 1 
This debate demonstrated how important and volatile 
the Indian question was becoming during the late 1820·s. 
Southern and western Congressmen were under great pressure 
to accomplish some degree of Indian removal and never missed 
an opportunity to appropriate money for that purpose. Pres­
sure on these Congressmen waS so great that in May, 1828 
they passed a Choctaw removal bill in the House. Although 
this was defeated in the Senate, it indicated the growing de­
mand by the national legislators to promote removal by legis­
lative action. It showed clearly that initiative for Indian 
policy was being taken away from the President, who had failed 
to act decisively. 
lIbid., p. 66). 
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In response to a congressional request for informa­
tion on the progress of Indian removal, Thomas McKenney re­
vealed that approximately 6000 Cherokees had voluntarily 
emigrated west of the Mississippi as a result of the Treaty 
of 1817 and that Creeks, numbering about 700, had moved west 
of Arkansas Territory under the Treaty of 1826. About the 
same number of Choctaws had moved across the Mississippi 
according to the option provided in the 1820 Treaty of 
Doak's Stand. The only other removals on a voluntary basis 
had involved the Kickapoos, Shawnees, Weas and Piankishaws, 
tribes in the northwest_ McKenney added that the "contingent 
fund" out of which the expenses for this removal had come 
was now insufficient for any further removal efforts. l 
Although during the Adams administration there had 
been some success persuading smaller, weaker tribes in the 
northwest to remove west of the Mississippi, the government 
had failed to achieve its removal objectives in the case of 
the major tribes of tne southeast. This failure, demonstrated 
at a time when white pressure on the Indians was reaching a 
peak, led to a serious crisis. Frontier elements demanded 
action and threatened to take matters in their own hands. 
The Indians still occupied large tracts of land east of the 
Mississippi, but their condition was deteriorating. Evidence 
lU.S., Congress, House of Reoresentatives, Thomas L. 
lVIcl\snney to James Barbour, March 26: 1828, House Doc. 233, 
20th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6. 
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showed that by 1828 whites were trading in and living on 
Indian lands and the government was impotent to stop the 
trespassing. 
During late 1828 James Barbour resigned as Secretary 
of War and was replaced by Peter B. Porter of New York. In 
his report, which accompanied Adams' Fourth Annual Message, 
Porter called attention to the diversity of opinion within 
the government and within the nation at large concerning 
Indian policy. 
The different views entertained not only by differ­
ent classes of our citizens, but even by the dif­
ferent offices acting under this Department, in 
regard to the leading measures of policy which 
ought to govern our intercourse with the Indians, 
have furnished fruitful sources of complaint 
against this Department, and oftrn of collision 
between the officers themselves. 
Porter went on to explain the conflicting opinions. He noted 
first that certain lI advocates of primitive and imprescriptible 
rights ll were contending that the Indian tribes were "inde­
pendent nations and have the sole and exclusive right to the 
property and government of the territories they occupy." He 
then referred to others who considered the Indians as II mere 
tenants at will, SUbject, like the buffalo of the prairies, 
to be hunted from their country whenever it may suit our in­
.11terests or convenience to take possession of it Porter then 
admitted that as yet "the intermediate line has never been 
1U.S., Congress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of 
'tJar, November 24,1828, Senate Doc. 1, 20th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
p. 20. 
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drawn by the government." 
Porter then offered his judgment, which was that 
"these Indians will not be permitted to hold the reserva­
tions on which they live, within the States, by their pre­
sent tenure, for any considerable period." Even if these 
Indians were not disturbed in their possession by the whites, 
Porter continued, they would not long be able to subsist 
because of the eventual destruction of game. He offered then 
a solution--that the government "take them under its paternal 
care, and exercise over their persons and property the 
salutary rights and duties of guardianship ... l 
With regard to the modern plan of voluntary removal, 
Porter said it was ineffective because the system involved 
two principles that counteracted each other. On the one 
hand the government was making great efforts to convince the 
Indians to move to an area west of the Mississippi "remark­
able for salubrity of climate, fertility of soil, and profu­
sion of game." Government officials were offering"liberal 
pecuniary inducements" to the emigrants. This policy was 
being frustrated, however, Porter suggested, because of 
another aspect of the government's handling of the Indians, 
the civilization program. Porter felt that missionaries and 
teachers, having been supported by government funds, had 
made very comfortable establishments in the Indian country 
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and were now "unwilling to be deprived of them by the re­
moval of the Indians."l 
Porter's answer to this contradiction in American 
Indian policy was to shape all laws and treaties to the 
attainment of the main object, "colonization." He advised 
that the removal plan be changed in several important re­
spects. First, he suggested that the emigrating Indians 
that chose to "devote themselves to the chase," be permitted 
to continue that way of life. Those, however, who wanted to 
"cultivate the arts of civilization" should be formed into a 
colony, "consisting of distinct tribes or communities, but 
placed contiguous to each other and connected, by general 
laws, which shall reach the whole." Lands in the colony 
should be apportioned among families and individuals, in 
severalty, and held in fee simple title with a temporary re­
straint upon the power of alienation. Importantly, Porter 
wanted to use the appropriation for civilizing the Indians 
in the colony. Thus the missionaries and teachers would fol­
low the Indians to their new home in the west. Another im­
portant suggestion, indicating the new attitudes of the govern­
ment, was that Indians who refused to emigrate should be 
granted individual land allotments "as shall be amply suf­
ficient for agricultural purposes" and then subjected to the 
municipal laws of the States in which they resided.-? 
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By the end of the Adams administration both the execu­
tive branch and Congress were admitting that speedy removal 
was the only way to save the Indians. Porter stated in 
early 1829 that "Judging the future by the past we cannot err 
in expecting eventual extinction unless our border becomes 
stationary and they be removed beyond it."l This pessimistic 
statement was a realization that the removal policy could not 
work without some method of forcing the Indians to emigrate. 
This could either be done by the federal government extend­
ing its laws over the Indians, the states extending their 
jurisdiction over the tribes, or by the use of military force. 
Calhoun, Monroe, Adams and Barbour had all recommended the 
first alternative. Congress was beginning to agree that some 
action was necessary, and at the end of Adams' administration 
the House Committee on Indian Affairs reported that removal 
2 
was the only way to preserve the Indian. This was the pre­
vailing mood in the federal bureaucracy when Adams left 
office. The Indians would either emigrate or be annihilated; 
there was no middle course. Voluntary removal, advocated as 
the only just policy since after the War of 1812, had led to 
a polarization of sentiments about the Indians' destiny and 
produced a crisis between the states and the federal 
1Thomas Cochran (ed.). The New American State Papers, 
Indian Affairs, Vol. I (W ilmington-.-Scholarly Resourc es, Inc., 
1972). p. 18). 
2prucha, p. 2)). 
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government. If pursued further its logical outcome was 
annihilation of the Indians. New legislation was needed, and 
the new President, Andrew Jackson, was the man to get it. 
--
p 
Chapter 6 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORCED REMOVAL 
"1 care nothing about clamors, Sir, mark: met I do 
precisely what I think just and right~1I1 Andrew Jackson had 
come to the White House, and with him came a fresh and dif­
ferent type of personality which would make the office of 
President more powerful than it had ever been. Jackson had 
Hess formal education than any previous President, and his 
reputation was built around his military career. His experi­
ence had made him grim and indomitable, but not dogmatic. 2 
His character was so different from any previou.s President 
that many men who knew him well spent a lifetime trying to 
understand him. Thomas Hart Benton, the statesman from 
Missouri, finally concluded that "the character of his mind 
was that of judgment, with rapid and almost intuitive percep­
tion, followed by an instant and decisive action.") Jackson 
did not try to deal in theories, but instead grasped at the 
substance of problemso "Once his mind was made up, no threats. 
no warnings of catastrophe, no dictates of prudence. could 
lArthur M. Schlesinger, The ~ of Jackson (Bastone 
Little, Brown and Coo, 1945), p:-40. 
)Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
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sway him."t This strong will led the young United States 
and gave the country definite direction. Once Jackson came 
to a conclusion as to what should be done, he would use any 
means to pursue his goal. He had tremendous self-control, 
but would often fly into performed rages in order to over­
2d . awe an au ~ence. He was strong, unbending and determined. 
Jackson also brought to the White House a frontier and 
western background. Born in frontier North Carolina, he had 
eventually moved to Nashville, Tennessee to practice law. 
This frontier experience combined with his strong will and a 
world of first-hand knowledge about Indians would make 
Andrew Jackson the greatest moving force ever to enter into 
the realm of American Indian policy. Jackson would put into 
operation and complete the removal policy, which had first 
been advocated by Thomas Jefferson. His experiences with 
Indians were many. He had fought them, made peace with them, 
and knew them as friends. By the time he became President he 
had many beliefs as to how Indian affairs should be handled 
and ignoring threats and warnings he put these into operation. 
Jackson's experience with Indians really began in 
Nashville, Tennessee. Jackson moved there around 1790. At 
this time someone was killed by Indians every 10 days in the 
Nashville vicinity.3 Soon after, Jackson was appointed 
lIbid., p. 40. 
3lV1arquis James, The Life of Andrew .:[ackson (New York. 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1938);P.58: 
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Attorney-General for this area and constantly was in contact 
with the Indian problem.1 He formed two conclusions about 
Indian affairs very early. He was opposed to "federal col­
laboration in Indian matters," and believed that the federal 
government did not know what was happening on the frontier. 2 
Jackson also was opposed to treaties with the Indians, feel­
ing that these agreements allowed Indians to murder with 
impunity. 3 He agreed with Monroe that Congress should legis­
late for the tribes. These two beliefs, formed early in his 
career, would reappear as part of his Presidential Indian 
policy. They seemed to be constantly reinforced throughout 
his early career. In 1793, Jackson wrote that the Indians 
had proclaimed peace in the western country to "lull the 
people to sleep.I' He repeated that the Indians used peace 
as an "easy road to commit murder with impunity.,,4 Again in 
1794, as the Indian situation reached a crisis on the 
Tennessee frontier, Jackson wrote that all hope of peace was 
gone and that the talks were designed only to throw the 
whites off guard. He felt experience showed that treaties 
only opened an easy door for the Indians to pass through 
1Ibid., p. 69. 2Ibid ., p. 95. 
3Ibid ., p. 69. 
4John Spencer Bassett (ed.), Corresp?ndance of ~ndrew 
Jackson, Vol. I (Washington, Carnegie Inst1tution, 1926), p. 
12. 
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"to butcher our citizens."l In this letter another aspect 
of Jackson's character came out. This was the feeling that 
every hostile act should be answered in kind. Jackson be­
lieved in an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, and his 
revenge could be terrible. In 1794, he questioned the policy 
of Congress which he believed was trying to solve the Indian 
question peacefully (Jackson at this point. ignored the war 
raging in the northwest and must have been speaking of local 
conditions). Instead he called for Congress to punish the 
"barbarians." He said that if A.mericans were to be punished 
for murdering Indians. then Indians should be punished for 
murdering Americans. He recommended that if the Indians did 
not give up murdering then their whole nation should be 
scouraged. 2 This aspect of revenge would constantly be pre­
sent in Jackson's policy as long as he deemed the Indians a 
military threat. Yet, as further investigation will show, he 
never became an Indian hater. He would attempt, despite his 
rhetoric, to distinguish between friendly and hostile Indians, 
and would never advocate exterminating all Indians by killing 
women and children. 
However, he did identify with frontier interests and 
by 1803 he had come to view the government's attempts to re­
move white intruders from Indian land as wrong. He wrote to 
Thomas Jefferson that such 8 policy was "better calculated for 
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the da.rk regions in the east, than for enlightened America."l. 
This belief would also reappear in his Presidential policy. 
Although Jackson would later, as the commander of the 
Southern Military District of the United States, remove white 
intruders by force, he never believed it was a practical, 
workable or correct policy. 
As the nation approached the War of 1812, the Creek 
Indians began to commit hostile acts on the southern frontier. 
Jackson proposed to fight the Creeks, but he never blamed 
them for what they did. Experiences from the Revolutionary 
War had left Jackson with a deep hatred of the British and 
he always blamed them for starting Indian 'wars. Fear of 
British intrigue would constantly influence Jackson's Indian 
policy. In 1808 he revealed these feelings in a letter to 
Thomas Jefferson. Writing about the hostile attitudes of the 
Creeks, he said he had no doubt that they had been stirred 
up by foreign agents among them. For Jackson, this brought 
to mind the Revolutionary War, where British influence 
"raised the scalping knife and tomahawk against our defense­
less women and children ••,2 
Once challenged, Jackson was not one to show mercy. 
By 1811, the tribes on the northern frontier were also at war 
and had defeated an American force. Jackson wrote, "In the 
west on the Wabash, excited by some secret influence the 
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savage tomahawk and scalping knife is raised, the blow is 
struck, savage war has commenced, and we have to regret, the 
loss of many of our brave countrymen who ••• fell bravely 
by the hands of deceitfUl and ruthless savages. The blood 
of our murdered fellows must be revenged."1 
This language might suggest that Jackson hated all 
Indians and felt that they must be driven from their homes 
and killed. Jackson's actions during the War of 1812 do not 
bear out this conclusion. Despite earning a respected mili­
tary reputation by defeating the British at New Orleans, 
Jackson spent the majority of the war fighting the Creek 
tribe in Mississippi and Alabama. It is actions in these 
campaigns that showed he did not desire the slaughter of all 
the Indians in North America. 
>
Jackson's first campaign against the Creeks was in 1812. . 
This expedition never reached its goal and there was no 
fighting. Marching his Tennessee volunteers towards the Creek 
frontier, Jackson was ordered to turn his supplies over to 
federal forces and dismiss his men. Although, his refusal to 
disperse his men on the spot and his disobedience of orders 
by marching home are widely controversial, it is the state­
ments about the pending Indian war which are of concern here. 
When first notified of the Creek uprisings Jackson wrote 
to Governor William Blount of Mississippi that he was horrified 
lIbid., p. 209. 
, . 
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by the massacre of our women and children. He repeated his 
oft used statement that "They (Creeks) must !2.!! punished. 1I 
After this he reasserted that he was sure they were urged 
on by British agents and felt that the sooner the Indians 
were attacked the better. He ended by saying that lilt is 
therefore necessary for the protection of the frontier that 
we march into the Creek nation, demand the perpetrators, at 
the point of the bayonet--if refused that we make reprisals-­
and lay their towns in ashes. lIl Jackson was a hard man and 
a determined warrior, but he was not cruel. Unlike many 
frontiersmen he did not blame the entire Creek nation. He 
realized that a group within the tribe was probably at fault. 
Thus, the tribal leaders should have an opportunity to sur­
render these guilty individuals. If they refused, then their 
nation was at fault and would feel the weight of his hand. 
On July 3 he again stated this view when he told Blount that 
he was ready to move against the Creek nation. Jackson felt 
that until the tribe gave up their prisoner (the Creeks sup­
posedly had a white woman hostage) and the hostiles, he felt 
justified in "laying waste their villages, burning their 
houses, killing their warriors and leading into captivity 
their women and children. 1l2 Once more it was clear that his 
revenge would be horrible, but at the same time it would not 
2Bassett, I, p. 2)0. 
, < 
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be genocide. Jackson had no intention of killing Women and 
children. They were innocent in his eyes and he would make 
war only on the warriors. This was a distinction that not 
many American Indian fighters made. Even Jackson's harsh re­
venge had a purpose. He wrote to Blount that if the Americans 
showed an immediate spirit of revenge the Cherokee would join 
them. He continued by saying that his course would also pre­
vent bad men from the Chickasaw and Choctaw from joining the 
Creeks.1 Jackson, did not lump all Indians together and real­
ized that there were different tribes. But he also believed 
that "fear is better than love with an Indian. u Thus a show 
of strength and swift revenge would win friends. He felt it 
waS not only possible to keep other tribes friendly this way, 
but also to deal with parts of nations while other parts were 
scalping whites. 2 He urged Blount and others to make the 
friendly portion of the Creek nation join in ~unishing the 
hostile part, and in this way make the friendly part dependent 
on the United States for protection.) The tone of Jackson's 
statements during the entire affair indicated that he believed 
the United states should punish Indians to make them fear the 
Americans. He felt that he must make an example of the hos­
tiles in order to keep friendly Indians on the side of the 
lLibrary of Congress, Presiden~ial fapers •.Andrew 
Jackson, President, U.S. 11.Q1-1845 (M1crof11m) Serl.es 1, 
reelS· 
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united States. 
Jackson could be a friend to the Indians and actually 
show compassion and concern over his red allies. Evidence of 
this could be seen in Jackson's dealings with the Cherokee 
during the affair. In JUly, 1812 Jackson wrote to John 
Strother, who was in Georgia organizing the Cherokee to aid 
in the campaign against the Creeks. He indicated that he 
would like Cherokee help but waS conoerned that "in the heat 
of battle some of my warriors, might mistake our friends 
and brothers the Cherokee for the Creeks, and through this 
mistake might kill our friends, which would leave a lasting 
grief upon my mind ••• " His decision was to use only 25 
Cherokee as scouts and in a battle he would keep these close 
to him.! Jackson showed great concern for the lives of 
Indians in this case and also showed great trust in his 
allies. He was willing to let them scout and direct his 
troop movements. He was, also, not in a hurry to pit Indian 
against Indian in order to save white lives. Out of this cam­
paign came several impressions. Jackson was willing to deal 
fairly with the Indians and consider some as his friends. 
He dealt harshly with his enemies, but not cruelly, and waS 
not an Indian hater, but a hard warrior. 
The true test of Jackson'S statements came in 1813, 
when he marched against the Creek and this time engaged in a 
lBassett, I, p. 232. 
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oloody war. His actions during the oampaign indioated that 
his hateful rhetoric was for purposes of inspiring his men and 
not for the annihilation of the Creek nation. As the war 
drew to a close he made it clear that he wanted no atrooities 
committed by his men. 
In March 1814, as the deciding Battle of Horseshoe 
Bend approached, Jackson's General Orders told his soldiers 
that they would soon have a chance to avenge the cruelties 
which the Creeks had committed upon their fellow defenseless 
citizens. However, he warned them that in victory and ven­
gence, they must be humane. The General did not want to tar­
nish his army's "virtuous reputation'~ by savage acts. 1 
Jackson delayed his attack on Horseshoe Bend in order' that 
Indian women and children could be evacuated and afterwards 
wrote that til lament that two or three women and children 
were killed by accident. u2 Jackson was not out to annihilate 
an entire people. His humane attitude towards Indians and 
his respect for them and their lives was manifested in many 
other ways. He continued to use friendly Indians as allies, 
and was also willing to sacrifice to protect these red allies. 
During the campaign he heard of the arrest of an old Cherokee 
friend by the name of "Old Ratcliffe, It a weal thy and respected 
man. The General waS enraged that 
l Ibid ., pp_ 486-487­
2Ibid ., p. 492. 
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a set of men should without any authority rob 
a man who is claimed as a member of the Cherokee 
nation, who is now frien~ly and engaged with us 
in a war against the hostile Creeks, in such an 
outrage, to the rules of war, the laws of nations 
and of civil society and well calculated to sour 
the minds of the whole nation against the United 
States, and is such as ought to meet with the 
frowns of every good citizen•••• 
Jackson ordered that his friend be released, returned his 
property and that the offenders be arrested and punished.1 
An interesting episode in the Creek campaign was 
Jackson's adoption of a Creek baby whose mother had been 
killed. In December, 1813. he wrote his wife that he was 
J. sending little Lyncoya, the baby, to her. Jackson said that 
the child was the only surviving member of his family and 
that the other Indians wanted to kill him. Jackson con­
cluded by saying that "charity and christianity says he 
ought to be taken care of and I send him to my little Andrew 
and I hope will adopt him as one of our family." 2 
All of Jackson's actions during the Creek campaign of 
1813-1814 indicated that he WaS fighting one ~nemy, which was 
a part of the Creek nation. He was hard on his enemy, but 
fair with Indians who were his friends and allies. He de­
finitely WaS not an Indian hater and did not pursue a war of 
extermination. 
1Bassett, I, pp. 414-415· 
2Ibid ., p. 400. 
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After the Creek war, Jackson exhibited a number of 
new feelings about the Indians. A paternalism which he had 
never shown during the war was one of them. In a letter to 
the Creeks Jackson displayed this. Every paragraph began 
"Friends and Brothers," but the text sounded more like father 
to son. Jackson said to the Creeks, "You know me to be your 
friend, you remember when your nation listened to the advice 
of bad men, and became crazy by the prophesies of your wicked 
prophets raised by the machinations of Great Britain and 
Spain, by the order of your father the President of the 
United States I marched an army into your nation to protect 
those who remembered his talk, and held him fast by the hand 
in friendship." 1 The letter went on in much the same vein. 
Jackson viewed the Indians almost as children, who had to be 
cared for. 
The General had been hard at the peace table, forcing 
the Creeks to give up over half of their land. Writing in 
May, 1814, he explained Why. He claimed that the I1hostile 
Creeks have forfeited all right to the territory we have oon­
quered • • He felt that the friendly part of the Creek• " 
nation should be left sufficient land, but was very desirous 
of cutting the Creeks off from British and Spanish influence 
in Florida. Jackson wanted to populate the area between the 
l John Spencer Bassett (ed.), Corresp0x;.dence of Andrew 
Jackson, Vol. II (Washingtonr Carnegie Instltution, 1927), 
p. 21b. 
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Indians and Florida with American settlers. He also advo­
cated taking cessions from the Chickasaw and Cherokee in 
order to extend settlements to the Mississippi and cut off 
communication between northern and southern Indians. Jackson 
ended by saying this was required by national security.l The 
desire for national security became a foremost consideration 
in Jackson's handling of Indian affairs after the War of 
1812. The desire to strengthen the southern frontier and 
improve its defenses dictated Jackson's Indian policy until 
the 1820's. In 1814 he informed the government the whole 
Creek nation was in a most wretched state and that they must 
be fed and clothed or necessity would compel them to embrace 
the friendship of the British. 2 In 1816. he wrote to James 
Monroe that he had received cessions from the Chickasaws and 
Cherokee which would open up an avenue of defense for the 
lower country (the south).J A. year later, Jackson wrote at 
length to Monroe on his views about Indian policy. and 
national defense was the keynote of the letter. Jackson 
said that everything should be done to "lessen our frontier" 
and "consolidate our settlements." This would cut off inter­
course between northern and southern tribes and afford the 
U.S. a strong defense. Jackson accused the government of 
being in open violation of the Constitution by reserving 
lIbid., pp. 2-). 
}Ibid •• p. 261. 
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land as hunting grounds for the Indians. He believed that 
since the game had been destroyed, the Indians had no use 
for the land. He felt that the rights of American citizens 
required this land to be turned over to them. 
Jackson took an early stand against the government's 
traditional poliey of making treaties with the Indians. con­
sidering the system as nan"absurdlty.u Viewing the Indians 
as SUbjects of the United States, he argued that Congress 
had the right to set Indian boundaries at will. In his opin­
ion the treaty system had started because of the initial 
mill tary wea.lrn.ess of the general government. Since that 
was no longer true. Jackson urged that the system be over­
thrown. Before concluding this letter Jackson endorsed the 
policy of civilizing the India.ns. criticized the scheme of 
bribing chiefs for land cessions, and asserted that "Honor, 
justice and humanity certainly require that a change of 
policy take place.»l 
It was apparent that Jackson had come to believe that 
the Indians should not be permitted to retain all their 
lands. At this point, Jackson recommended simply legislating 
for the Indians' own good by reducing their land holdings and 
turning them into farmers. Even at this date. however, he 
was thinking along the lines of the later removal policy. In 
June of 1817 he wrote to his friend and business partner John 
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Coffee, offering the opinion that the tribes would be will­
ing to exchange their lands east of the Mississippi for lands 
west of the river if they wanted to populate the area be­
tween the Indians and Florida with American settlers. He 
also advocated taking cessions from the Chickasaw and Cherokees 
in order to extend settlements to the Mississippi and cut off 
communication between northern and southern Indians. Jackson 
ended by saying that this was necessary for purposes of 
national security.1 
The concern for national security became a foremost 
consideration in Jackson's handling of Indian affairs after 
the War of 1812. The desire to strengthen the southern 
frontier and improve its defenses dictated Jackson's policies 
until the 1820's. In 1814 he info~ed the War Department 
that the Creek nation was in a most wretched state and would 
probably join the British unless given food and clothing by 
the United States. 2 In 1816 he wrote to Monroe and boasted 
that he had just obtained land cessions from the Chickasaws 
and Cherokees and that this new territory would open up an 
avenue of defense for the lower oountry (the south).) A 
year later, Jackson wrote at length to Monroe on the SUbject 
of Indian policy. National defense was the keynote of his 
letter. he stated that everything should be done to "lessen 
lIbid.t pp. 2-3. 
3Ibid •• p. 261. 
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our frontier" and "consolidate our se-ctlements. 1t Jackson 
accused the government of open violation of the Constitution 
by reserving land as hunting grounds for the Indians. The 
General believed that since game had been destroyed, the 
Indians had no use for the land. It should rather be turned 
over to the whites. 
Jackson felt that a few men, who were not full blooded 
Indiana, had gained political and economic control over the 
tribes. but did not represent the feeling of the majority of 
the members. Jackson felt this minority was fattening on the 
annuities of the tribes and the labor of the poor Indians.1 
At the same time Jackson was becoming convinced that 
it was not only improper to remove white intruders from 
Indian's lands. but that it was also futile. As Commander of 
the Southern Military District of the United States it was 
his responsibility to do this when ordered. By 1817 he 
claimed that experience showed it was useless simply to re­
move intruders who were on Indian land. They would always 
return. Jackson felt that the only way to solve the problem 
was to turn the offenders over to civil authorities for 
prosecution and to confiscate their property for public auc­
tion. Thus sucCess depended on the cooperation of local 
civil authoritiea. 2 As has already been seen this cooperation 
was seldom to be found. Jackson had another problem and that 
2Ibid ., p. J08. 
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was that his troops. mostly militia. would never assist in 
this kind of operation. He felt that the only thing left was 
to try and get land cessions from the Indians.1 In a final 
effort, Jackson proposed using Indian troops to enforce the 
tribal boundaries, but Secretary of War Calhoun vetoed this 
scheme when he found he had to pay them. 2 
Andrew Jackson became a persistent advocate of Indian 
removal during the Monroe administrations. In a letter to 
Calhoun in 1821 Jackson stated his belief that if it was the 
real object of the government to transfer across the 
Mississippi all Indians who were not disposed to become citi­
zens then it was proper to act promptly. Congress, Jackson 
wrote, should establish the rule of legislating for, rather 
than treating with, the Indians within the territorial limits 
of the United States. Such a policy WOUld, in Jackson's 
opinion, secure more justice to the Indians.) 
In July, 1826, Jackson wrote at length about removal 
in a letter to Colonel John S. Terrill. Terrill had recent­
ly been selected by the War Department to serve as agent to 
2Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the 
Formative Years. The Indian Trade and the Intercourse Acts, 
122Q-183n {Cambridge. Harvard University Press, 1962~.-P:-
ro:s:­
)ThoMaS C. Cochran (ed.), The New American State 
Papers, Indian Affairs, Vol. X (Wilmingtonl Scholarly 
Resources. Inc., 1972), p. 262. 
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the Chickasaws and to prepare that tribe for a land cession. 
Jackson advised Terrill to impress upon the Chickasaws that 
by removing they would at last be free from the encroachment 
of white settlers. He added that if the Chickasaws united 
out west with the Choctaw and the Creeks they would all be­
come a great, powerful and happy peoPle.1 A few months later 
he urged John Coffee, who was preparing to negotiate a re­
moval treaty with the Choctaws, to obtain a cession on the 
best terms possible because IIthis section of the country is 
of great importance to the prosperity and strength of the 
lower Mississippi and a dense white population would add 
much to its safety in a state of war." 2 
Unlike previous Presidents, Jackson brought to the 
White House a vast wealth of experience concerning Indian 
affairs. As a local frontier offieial, soldier, eitizen and 
treaty commissioner he had dealt often with Indian problems. 
This experience gave him a distinctive western outlook in 
dealing with the tribes. He had learned to respect Indians 
as human beings, but saw them as children who had to be told 
What was best for them. He had fought them and had early 
concluded that for reasons of national defense and the ulti­
mate civilization of the Indians they must relinquish much 
of their land. On the eve of his election he stood as a firm 
lBassett, III, pp. 308-309. 
2Ibid •• p. 312. 
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supporter of the removal policy. He was not an Indian hater, 
he simply was committed to the idea that the government must 
treat the Indians as dependents and not as sovereign nations. 
Remembering Jackson's statement that he did precisely what 
he thought was right, there was little doubt that Indian re­
moval would be aggressively pushed when the General became 
President. 
s
 
Chapter 7 
THE SUCCESS OF REMOVAL 
The election of Andrew Jackson signalled the be­
ginning of an aggressive United States Indian policy. Jackson 
was determined to remove the Indians west of the Mississippi 
River. This in itself was not a different policy. but the 
methods Jackson used and the force and energy with which he 
pursued his policy were all new. Indian removal matured as 
a major national issue between 1829 and 1836. and despite a 
strong, vocal opposition Jackson successfully removed the 
Indians of the south and northwest to the western side of 
the Mississippi. 
In his First Inaugural Address. Jackson spoke very 
briefly about Indian affairs. He stated that his policy 
would be "just and liberal" and would give Ithumane and con­
siderate attention to their (Indian) rights and wants which 
is consistent with the habits of our Government and the 
feelings of our people."i This statement was rather vague, 
but in his First Annual Message to Congress in December, 1829 
1James D. Richardson (ed.), Messages and Papers of 
the Presidents. 1.1.§..2.-1J2.2l. Vol. II (Washingtonl Government 
PrInting OffIce. 1896J~ p. 438. 
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Jackson spoke at some length concerning his Indian policy. 
He began by telling Congress that it had been the policy of 
the government to introduce the arts of civilization to the 
Indians "in the hope of gradually reclaiming them from a 
wandering life." He then charged that previous administra­
tions had defeated their own civilization efforts by simul­
taneously buying Indian land and thrusting the tribes far­
ther into the wilderness. In Jackson's eyes this kept the 
tribes wandering and also made them suspicous of the United 
states. Jackson felt the government had spent lavishly to 
defeat its own policy in that the Indians, "receding farther 
and farther to the west have retained their savage habits. II 
The President acknowledged that some southern tribes 
had made some progress towards civilization and had attempted 
to establish an independent government in Georgia and Alabama. 
These states had responded by extending their jurisdiction 
over the Indian lands and the tribes were now turning to the 
government for helP.1 Jackson's response to this call for 
help was unprecedented and became the major method of forcing 
the Indians to accept removal. He answered the Indians by 
quoting to Congress the const!tutional provision. "no new 
State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of 
lJackson is here referring to the pr?cess.which began 
during the Adams administration and is descrlbed ln Chapter
5. It will be remembered that Adams took no steps to counter 
these state measures, thus leaving any action to Jackson. 
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any other state ll without the consent of its legislature. 
Jackson went on to say that Ilthere is no constitutional. 
conventional or legal process which allows them (the 
southern states) less power over the Indians within their 
borders than is possessed by Maine or New York." In Jackson' s 
judgment the federal government could not protect the Indians 
in their attempt to establishment of a "separate republic ll 
within a State or territory without destroying the states 
which it was established to preserve. In short. Jackson 
told the Indians they would"get no help from the executive.1 
Instead he advised them to emigrate b,vond the 
Mississippi or submit to the laws of those states. For the 
first time. a President had denied that the federal govern­
ment had the power to control Indian affairs within the 
limits of the states. In one swift stroke. Jackson des­
troyed the huge pYramid of federal power over the Indians, 
which had been built on the small constitutional foundation 
that gave Congress the power to regUlate trade with the 
tribes. He had never approved of treating with the Indians 
and had always advocated letting Congress legislate for 
their interests. but now he was going a step further. The 
President maintained that as long as the Indians were within 
the limits of states or organized territories. these bodies 
had the power to legislate for the tribes. This became the 
lRichardson, pp. 458-459. 
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first step in forcing the Indians to remove. By passing 
laws which destroyed tribal governments the states could de­
prive the Indians of their rights and property and make 
them want to remove for sheer survival.1 
Encouraged by Jackson's stand. Georgia, Mississippi. 
North Carolina and Tennessee all extended their laws over the 
Indian lands. These laws abolished tribal government and. 
in effect. ended Indian nations. Mississippi's Act. extend­
ing its jurisdiction over the Indian territory within its 
bounds. was a good example of the trend. This act, passed 
in 1830. stated that all rights. privileges, immunities and 
franchises held by Indians and their descendents not recog­
nized by common law were abolished. Instead. all rights of 
whites were extended to the Indians and all laws. statutes 
and ordinances of Mississippi were in force in the territory 
occupied by the Indians. The laws imposed fines or prison 
sentences upon any Indian calling himself. chief. Mingo or 
headman. 2 These statutes instantly replaced Indian culture 
with white custOMS. On the surface they appeared fair in 
that the Indians were given equal rights. However. this was 
looary E. Young. "Indian Removal ~d ~and A~lotmer;ta 
The Civilized Tribes and Jacksonian Just1ce. Amer1Can H1S­
torical Review, LXIV. 1 (October, 1958). p. 35· 
2Thomas C. Cochran (ed.). ~ ~ew American State 
Papers. Indian ,Affairs. Vol. I (W1lmingtonl Scholarly 
Resources Inc., 1972). p. 267. 
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wholly incorrect, because the redmen were seldom told their 
rights and were easily cheated. In the end, the tribes 
could never withstand the white pressure and removed. Since 
the denial of federal power to help the Indians was Jackson's 
greatest instrument in achieving removal, he was forced to 
develop a massive rationale for his constitutional interpre­
tation. Many felt that the federal government had been 
given the power to control Indian affairs through the con­
stitution and several treaties which had preceded Andrew 
Jackson. Responding to a Senate Resolution requesting in­
formation on the chief executive's compliance with the pro­
visions of the trade and intercourse act of 1802, Jackson 
issued a special message to the Senate in 1831, defending 
his viewpoint. 
He claimed that the executive had carried out its 
responsibilities in relation to trade and intercourse with 
the Indians. He said that citizens of the United States were 
restrained under sufficient penalties from entering upon 
Indian land for the purpose of hunting, settling, ranging 
their horses or cattle, or traveling through without permis­
sion. He conceded that the President was authorized to use 
military force to secure observance of these provisions. 
Jackson felt that he had done this until the states extended 
their laws over the Indians. After this, enforcement was 
their problem. The President defended this action at length 
by saying that there was not a "single instance" in the 
t- _ 
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legislation of the country in which the Indians had been re­
garded as possessing political rights, independent of the 
control and the authority of the states within the limits 
1
of which they resided. For proof of his assertion Jackson 
resorted to the Articles of Confederation. He used a case 
in 1792 in which a tribe of Indians within South Carolina 
petitioned Congress to have certain tracts of land secured 
to them. Congress, in turn, recommended that the legisla­
ture of South Carolina take care of the matter and refused 
to interfere in the conflict. 2 
Jackson next referred to a proclamation issued by 
Congress in 1783 which stated that measures of Congress which 
were relative to Indian affairs should not be construed to 
affect the territorial claims of any state or the legisla­
tive rights within state limits. 3 While this had transpired 
during the time of the Articles of Confederation, Jackson did 
not feel the situation had been altered by the adoption of 
the Constitution. He claimed that the clausel "Congress 
shall have power to regUlate commerce with the Indian tribes" 
gave the general government complete control over the inter­
course of only those tribes who were not within the limits 
of any state. He added that in New England and the Middle 
lRichardson, p. 537. 
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Jackson ad­
Atlantic states the tribes had been left to the undisturbed 
control of the states in which they resided. 
mitted that the south was an exception to the rule and that 
the Federal Government had concluded treaties with the 
Cherokees in 1785 and 1790, at a time when North Carolina 
could not enforce its laws in the western areas. Yet Jackson 
asserted that these cases did not change "the political rela­
tions of the Indians to the states or to the Federal govern­
ment. II Ja.ckson concluded his aJ!"gument by restating. 
Years since I stated to them (the Indians) my
belief that if the states chose to extend their 
laws over them it would not be in the power of 
the Federal Government to prevent it. My opinion
remains the sa.me, and I can see no alternative 
for them but that of their removal to the west or1a quiet submission to the state laws. 
This then was Jackson's defense of his states' rights posi­
tion. It was a totally new concept and stirred great con­
troversy. But the idea was so necessary to removal that 
Jackson fought to defend the position. 
The denial of federal control worked well to aid re­
moval efforts for one basic reason. The Indians were always 
protected and treated better by the federal government; state 
authorities usually deprived them of their civil rights, and 
. d t~1.·th federal protec­this led to the theft of tribal Ian. " 
tion gone the Indians had to choose between removing or 
SUbmitting to the jurisdiction of the state. Jackson made 
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removal appealing by explaining that on the western side of 
the Mississippi, outside of the limits of states and terri­
tories, the government could protect the Indians without a 
clash of state and federal authorities. Jackson explained 
this in his First Annual Message. He sincerely felt that if 
the Indians remained within the limits of states, the fate 
of the Mohegan and Delaware (virtual annihilation) would 
overtake such great tribes as the Creek, Choctaw and 
Cherokee. In order to preserve these tribes the government 
had to establish an ample district west of the Mississippi 
river, out of the limits of the states and territories, 
which would be guaranteed to the Indians for as long as they 
occupied it. In this district the United states government 
would not interfere, except to protect the tribes while the 
"benevolent" worked to bring them civilization. He felt 
emigration should be voluntary, but again warned that those 
1Indians, who stayed would be subject to state laws. 
Jackson believed the Indians had to be removed, but 
did not want to abandon them entirely. He was willing to 
give them their own land and protect them from' outside inter­
ference. In this way, the tribes would be given more time 
to learn the arts of civilization and be better able to 
ass imila te • 
Jackson offered defenses for removal over and over 
e
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again. Most messages concerning Indian removal contained 
lofty statements about national honor, justice and humanity 
demanding that the tribes be preserved through removal. 
While humanitarian reasons definitely were involved, there 
were others. Jackson' s Second Annual Message to Congress 
highlighted these other defenses of removal. He said that a 
successful cUlmination of removal would end all danger of a 
collision between state and federal authorities. Jackson 
further believed that Indian removal would strengthen the 
west by opening an area from Tennessee to Louisiana for set­
tlement. He indicated that Mississippi and Alabama would 
soon be relieved of their Indian occupancy and would be able 
to advance rapidly in wealth, population and power, while 
the removed tribes would be free to pursue happiness in their 
own way. He felt that removal would retard the process of 
disintegration and give the Indians time sufficient for 
grEldual civilization. Jackson was doubtful that the Indians 
could be civilized where they were. He said that despite 
the efforts of philanthropists, the progress of decay among 
the Indians had never been stopped. Well aware of his history, 
Jackson pointed out that one by one the great New England 
tribes had disappeElred. He then drew a parallel between 
Indian removElI and the history of the westward movement to 
show that his policy WElS not cruel. The President pointed 
out that it WElS a great source of joy thElt the sons and 
daughters of Americans should leave home and travel thousands 
5~:!~-------------­
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of miles west. He then asked how it could be cruel for the 
Indians to do the same if the government paid for their ex­
penses, gave them a new home and supported them for a year? 
Jackson concluded by repeating that it was the duty of the 
government to extinguish in the states, as soon as possible, 
the Indian title to all lands Which were included within 
their limits.1 These were the basic defenses of Jackson's 
removal policy. They included humanitarianism, a form of 
manifest destiny, the resolution of a delicate state-federal 
dilemma and the desire to strengthen the defense of the 
frontier. These justifications were repeated over and over 
again by Jackson and the supporters of his policy.2 
In 1831 the President told Congress that time and ex­
perience had shown that living in the states was dangerous 
to the peace and injurious to the Indians. He also reasserted 
the Manifest Destiny feeling when he said that "the time is 
not distant, it is hoped, when Ohio will be no longer embar­
rassed with the Indian population." Jackson ended by saying 
that Indians, who were surrounded by whites, became deprived 
l Ibid ., pp. 520-522 • 
2J a.ckson'g concept of Manifest Destiny.was contrad~c­
tory. He felt that the states needed all t~elr land t9 rlS~ 
to their full glory. Yet, the concept didn t necessarlly 
envision the United states expanding to the west coast •. 
Jackson was placing the Indians between the u.~. and t~lS 
goal. Thus Jackson's concept of nationa~ f~lfl11ment In­
volved the growth and maturing of the eXlstlng states. 
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of political and civil rights and wound up "dragging out a 
wretched existence, without excitement, without hope and al­
most without thought."l 
His Fifth Annual Message in 1833 was almost identical. 
He began by saying that once the Indians were removed, it 
would terminate many "difficult and embarrassing questions 
a.rising out of their anoma.lous political condition." 
Jackson went on to repeat that Indians who were surrounded 
by whites "have neither the intelligence, the industry, the 
moral habits, nor the desire of improvement" for a favorable 
change of their condition. "Established in the midst of a 
superior race, and without appreciating the causes of their 
inferiority or seeking to control them, they must necessar­
ily yield to the force of circumstance and ere long dis­
appear. II Jackson concluded by saying that Indians who had 
removed were prosperous and content.2 These defenses were 
used time and time again. 
Despite the obvious rhetorical overstatement, Jackson 
was right in his belief that the Indians were decaying. All 
reports indicated that white pressure on the tribes were in­
creasing. While Jackson claimed that he had completely 
withdrawn federal protection from the tribes, records did not 
reflect this. The reason why Jackson continued to protect 
lRichardson, II, p. 555· 
2Richardson, III, p. 33· 
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the Indians can be seen in a letter from Thomas McKenney, 
still the head of the Indian bureau, to Lewis Cass, Governor 
of the Michigan Territory in 1829. McKenney informed Cass 
that any citizen in violation of the Intercourse Act should 
be prosecuted. It was by this means that the Indians could 
be made sensible of the protection of the government and 
their confidence maintained.1 In order to get the Indians 
to remove Jackson had to convince the tribes that the govern­
ment could protect them in their new homes. As a result, 
the President did attempt to keep white settlers off Indian 
land. Also, as the Indians made cessions the government had 
to be able to keep settlers off these lands until they could 
be surveyed and sold. Despite these needs, all of the 
government's restrictions appeared futile. 
For years McKenney had acknOWledged that all Indians 
who bordered on white communities were SUffering from the 
introduction of alcohol among them. 2 The situation was 
getting so serious that in July, 1832 Congress approved an 
act which said that uno ardent spirits shall be hereafter 
introduced under any pretense, into the Indian country."] 
This apparently had little effect. A Grand Jury reported in 
lClarence Edwin Carter (ed.), Xhe Territorial Papers 
of the United states, Vol. XII (Washington I u.s. Government 
Printing Office. 1945), p. 53· 
2Ibid ., p. 171 • 
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18)2 that as many as sixty barrels of alcohol had been taken 
into the Creek nation at one time. The result was the death 
of several Indians. The jury, however, could not indict 
anyone for doing this, since they could find no evidence. 
They complained that the whiskey traders knew the law and 
used every means to evade it.1 Almost a year, later John 
Stuart, an agent in the Arkansas Territory, claimed it was 
impossible to stop the flow of alcohol into the Indian ter­
ritory because of the many roads and paths. He further 
claimed that the illegal traders were so numerous and had 80 
many jurors and justices of the peace under their control 
that he could not prosecute. He indicated that the traders 
were so bold they had set up trading houses right next to 
the Choctaw line, and that the Indians would cross the line, 
buy whiskey and flee back into the brush. In concluding, 
Stuart said the Indians were more civilized than the people 
of western Arkansas. 2 
Illegal traders were not the Indians only problems. 
By 18)2 white farmers were pressing the tribes everywhere 
and the situation was serious. In one instance, federal 
troops removed settlers from Creek lands in 18)2 and burned 
their cabins. These intruders returned with the local 
sheriff and a writ to arrest the federal marshall in charge 
lCarter, XXI, p. 518. 
2Ibid., pp. 710-711. 
I. 
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of white removal. A skirmish resulted and the sheriff was 
1bayoneted by a federal trooper. By 1833 the intruders had 
returned with a sheriff and run off the Indians. When the 
federal marshall again tried to force them off, he found him­
self facing a volunteer army of intruders. 2 The situation 
was so serious that Secretary of War Lewis Cass finally 
issued an order for federal troops to assist in white re­
moval.) This proved impossible, for as soon as the soldiers 
left, the intruders would return. These events tended to 
confirm that Jackson was right about one thing. The Indian's 
hold on his land and culture was deteriorating and the 
government was not strong enough to protect it. Since the 
majority of Indians were not assimilating fast enough, re­
moval did appear as the most likely answer. 
As has been seen. Jackson' s removal plan was similar 
in its essential elements to the removal schemes envisaged 
by officials in the War Department during the administrations 
of Monroe and Adams. The government would set aside an ample 
district of land west of the Mississippi and divide this 
l Mary E. Young, "The Creek Frauds. A Study. in Con­
science and Corruption, II ~Iississippi ~il1eY !iistor1cal Re­
view, Vol. XLII, No.3 (December, 1955 , p. Ll-16. 
2Grant Foreman. Indian Removal. The Emigration, of 
the Five Civilized Tribes of Indian.! (Norman. Unrvers1.ty 
or-Oklahoma Press, 1932), pp. 116-117. 
3;rbid., p. 116. 
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region among the several tribes emigrating from the east. 
The government would guarantee that this "permanent home" 
for the Indians would be kept outside the limits of the 
states and territories. In addition, the government would 
provide an Indian agent, contribute resources for a continu­
ing civilization program, and protect the Indians from white 
intruders. Finally, the total cost of removal would be 
paid for out of the pUblic treasury. 
The actual legislative basis for Jackson's Indian 
removal policy came in the form of the Indian Removal Bill 
passed by Congress late in May, 1830. In addition to auth­
orizing the President to negotiate an exchange of eastern 
Indian land for land west of the Mississippi it committed 
the government to compensate the Indians for improvements 
on ceded lands, to pay removal costs, and pay one year's sub­
sistence for the Indians after their removal. The final sec­
tion appropriated the sum of $500,000 for the purpose of 
. . •. 1g1vlng effect to the above prOVISIons. 
Opponents of Jackson's Indian removal program mus­
tered their forces and tried desperately to defeat the re­
moval bill. The struggle, both in and outside of Congress, 
was in part sectional and partly purely an issue of party 
politics. In general, removal received support from the 
1 1 G' b The Chl'elm (Norman,.. saws UniversityArrel M.1S0n, . ...... 
of Oklahoma Press. 1971), P:-13j. 
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south and the west and met the resistance of the northeast 
and middle-Atlantic states. The political division was 
quite clear-cut. Jacksonians defended removal and the opposi­
tion party tried valiently to defeat the removal bill and the 
policy. 
Congressional opposition to the Jackson removal policy 
was led by Senator Theodore Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, who 
spoke eloquently and effectively against the policy. It was 
Frelinghuysen who tried to expose the true intent of the re­
moval bill by offering an amendment. 
Provided, always, that until the said tribes or
 
nations shall choose to remove, as by this act
 
is contemplated, they shall be protected in
 
their present posessions, and in the enjoyment
 
of all their rights of territory, and government,
 
as heretofore exercised and enjoyed, from all
 
interruptions and encroachments. 1
 
The purpose of this amendment was to test the sincerity of 
the proponents who insisted that no use of force was con­
templated by the bill. Frelinghuysen's amendment was de­
feated by a vote of 27 to 20 and this proved to be the most 
decisive vote on the issue in the senate. The south voted 
· d t 18 t 0 New England sup-sol i dly aga1nst the amen men , 0 .• 
ported the amendment 11 to 1· 2 
l Da1e Van Every, Disinherited & 'Fhe Lost Birthright 
of the American Indian (New York, Willlam Morrow & Company,
196bJ7 p. 117. -_... 
2 Ibid • 
-
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Frelinghuysen, undismayed by the rejection of his 
amendment, lashed out against the removal bill in an impas­
sioned speech that emphasized the immorality and injustice 
of removal, He asserted that treaties with the Indians were 
the "supreme law of the land" and that if violated "Truth and 
honor have no citadel on earth--their sanctions are despised 
and forgotten, and the law of the strongest prevails."l 
After a stinging attack against the inhumanity of the 
removal bill, Frelinghuysen turned to the specific case of 
the Cherokee. In his eyes the United states had pressed 
this tribe to give up everything they had, and added, "now 
that they have nothing left with which to satisfy our crav­
ings we propose to annul every treaty and with violence and 
perfidy, drive the Indian from his home." In his eyes this 
Was criminal. The Senator concluded that if the tribes were 
protected and educated they would rise spectacularly and beg 
Congress to override Georgia's laws, even if this meant 
2civil war. 
Using such arguments, Frelinghuysen mobilized Congres­
sional opposition to removal. The debate on the Indian Re­
moval Bill was the high point of opposition to the policy. 
Yet, in spite of such passionate arguments the bill narrowly 
lRegister of Debates !n Qongress, 21st Congo, 1st 
Sess., Vol. 6, pp:-310-J20. 
2Ibid • 
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passed. On A.pril 24, 1830 the bill authorizing the President 
to negotiate with the tribes for removal was ordered by the 
Senate to be engrossed for a third reading and sent to the 
House. The vote was 28 to 19. and showed the sectional 
aspects of removal. Voting in favor of the bill were both 
Senators from Virginia. Georgia, South Carolina, Kentucky, 
Alabama, Tennessee, Louisiana, North Carolina, Mississippi, 
Indiana and Illinois. Opposed were all the Senators from 
Vermont, Maine, Massachusetts. Connecticut, Rhode Island and 
Delaware. The other states split their votes. Clearly re­
moval was favored by an alliance of the western and southern 
states, while New England Senators generally opposed the 
policy.1 This. also. roughly corresponded with Andrew 
Jackson's political strength and showed that removal was a 
party issue. 
In the house, the vote was much closer, but on May 26, 
the bill passed 103 to 97 and was sent back to the Senate for 
2concurrence. On the same day the Senate approved the House 
copy and the b ill became law. Although there wa.s much more 
deba.te on the policy, the passage of this act meant defeat 
for those opposed to removal. The policy went into opera­
tion, and, despite opposition, continued to conclusion. 
Jackson's biggest opposition actually came from out­
side the Congress. The American Board of Commissioners for 
2~bid •• p. 1136. 
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Foreign Missions, aided by friendly Congressmen, began a 
pamphlet and petition war to mobilize pUblic opinion against 
removal.! The most damaging articles were written by 
Jeremiah Everts under the name IIWilliam Penn. II Everts wrote 
several passionate articles in defense of Indian rights 
which appeared in the Daily National IntelligencE!. He also 
got several petitions started among clergymen and many north­
eastern communities sent these to Congress. 2 This was a 
great annoyance to Jackson, but pro-Jackson newspapers and a 
counter campaign by pro-removal clergymen managed to keep 
this activity isolated to portions of New England. 
Although these groups bombarded Congress with peti­
tions, Jackson waS able to partially discredit the charges of 
the "Foreign Missions Society" by pointing out that these men 
were only interested in preventing removal because they had 
an economic interest in the Indian lands. These mission­
aries did have a vested interest in opposing removal since 
they operated nineteen schools in the Choctaw, Cherokee and 
000 
•Chick..asaw districts. This was an investment of about $100 , 
Jackson never advocated compensating this group for the losses 
caused by removal. Instead, he accused them of trying to re­
tain their investment at the expense of the Indians. All in 
Young, Redskins, R1;1ff~es~ir~s and Rednecks$ 1Mary E. 
Indian Allotments ill Alabama and !,!1.ssJ.Ss1.P~:!' 18JO-~~60 {Normanl UnIversity of Oklahoma Press, 19 1), p. 1 
ps-------------------­I!~'\~, 
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all, the opposition to Jackson's Indian POll'CY· . butwas nOlsy, 
ineffective. Jackson's party managed to keep control in 
Congress, and held to the party line in voting on Indian 
policy issues. Most removal legislation was passed on sched­
ule and in spite of the clamor from very articulate defenders 
of the Indians. 
Jackson, of course, had many defenders of his removal 
policy who developed a standard set of arguments reflecting 
Ja.ckson's own rationale. In Mississippi the advocates of re­
moval argued that the state needed more land to attract im­
migrants from the east. They felt that the Choctaw imposed 
a heavy financial burden on Mississippi because they didn't 
pay taxes, and insisted that the tribe harbored run-away 
slaves and criminals. The proponents argued that since the 
Indians were hunters and not farmers they were inferior and 
incapable of being civilized. Finally, they sa.id tha.t the 
1Choctaw lands were in Mississippi and belonged to the state.
On a national level these arguments or parts of these argu­
ments were taken up by administration supporters. 
In Washington Jackson had the full support of the men 
in hiB cabinet who were involved in Indian affairs. His 
first Secretary of War was John Eaton, an old Tennessee 
friend who had served under Jackson in the Creek campaign. 
lArthur H. DeRosier. Jr •• The Removal of the Chocta~T preSS; 1970),Indians A(Knoxville. University of ennessee 
p. 107. 
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Eaton was a strong supporter of removal. J kac son retained 
Thomas McKenney as the Superintendent of Indian Affairs 
(McKenney waB replaced in 1831 by Elbert Herring, who was 
also a great supporter of removal). McKenney had become 
pessimistic and no longer felt that salvation could take 
place if the Indians remained where they were.1 He Bupported 
Jackson's programs and when a great pamphlet campaign was 
waged against removal in 1829 he enlisted New York City 
clergymen on Jackson's side by organizing the board for the 
"Emigration, Preservation and Improvement of the Aborigines. 1I 2 
This group used the church's name to solicit support for re­
moval. In 1831, Jackson's cabinet resigned (for reasons not 
involving Indian affairs) and the President chose Lewis Cass 
to be Secretary of War. Cass had been Governor of the 
Michigan Territory and was experienced in Indian affairs. A 
stUdy of Cass' treaties showed that he continually tried to 
win the affection and respect of many Indians who were in­
clined to believe in the power and generosity of the BritiSh 
government. During his work on the frontier his courage and 
dignity, coupled with honesty and mercy, had won from the 
Indians a respect and even a love for him. Cass waS friendly 
lFrancis Paul Prucha, American !ndian Policy in the 
Formative Years I The Indian Tract,! and the Intercourse Acts l12Q_~ (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1962~, p. 
225. 
2 Ibid ., p. 237. 
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towards the Indians, but did believe strongly in removal as 
their only hope. He contributed greatly to the selling of 
the Administration policy by writing at great length, in 
support of removal in the North American Review in 1830.1 
Using the basic pro-removal arguments Cass built a strong 
case for the policy. Jackson's party controlled Congress and 
the president managed to get sufficient support for his 
Indian program. Strong help came from the Committee on 
Indian Affairs, which constantly advocated removal through­
out the period. 
In 1830 representative John Bell (Tenn.), a member of 
the Committee on Indian Affairs, told the House of Represen­
tatives that if the Indians remained where they were, they 
would be destroyed. He said that assimilation could not be 
relied on to save the masses of southern Indians and Claimed 
that the common (full blood) Indian was already in danger of 
being considered a degraded caste in his own country. Bell 
concluded by saying that removal was the only hope of atoning 
2for the mistakes of the past. In the same year the Commit­
tee on Indian Affairs recommended removal as the only hope 
1Lewis Cass, "Removal of the Indians," North American Eevie~, Vol. XXX (Boston: Gray and Bowen, 18)0), pp. 62-120. 
2Thomas C. Cochran (ed.), ~ American §tate Paperss 
IndiaU Affairs, Vol. 9 (Wilmington, Scholarly Resources, 
Inc., 1972), p. 1750 
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and introduced the Indian Removal Bill. In a strong state­
ment on February 11, 1830, the Committee told the House that 
Congress could not decide the Georgia question. This was 
the President's job. They claimed that only a small, but 
powerful minority of whites and mixed-bloods wanted the 
Cherokee to remain in Georgia. Finally, the Committee didn't 
feel the Cherokee had 'I titIe by occupancy" since they had 
once formed a treaty with Great Britain, and recommended that 
the President should be given the power to exchange a dis­
trict in the west for Indian land east of the Mississippi. 1 
The first real challenge to Jackson's policy came 
through the courts of the United States. The Cherokee nation, 
with its lands in Georgia, was rendered desperate by the 
action of the Georgia legislature in December, 1829. Georgia 
simply announced that on June 1, 1830 all Cherokee laws, 
orders and regulations of any kind made by the Cherokee 
government would be nullified. Henceforth Georgia laws 
would be extended over all Cherokees. Without federal pro­
tection the Cherokee felt that the state of Georgia would 
annihilate them as a political society and seize their lands. 
They were absolutely correct. This waS the cornerstone of 
the removal policy and this action waS designed to force the 
Indians to remove. The tribe took their case to the Supreme 
p
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Court and asked for an injunction to restrain the Georgia 
ordinance. This was an attack on the very foundation of re­
moval. John Marshall, in 1831, in the case of The Cherokee 
Nation Y!. The State of Georgia decided that the Cherokee 
were not a foreign nation, but were a "domestic dependent 
nation" and, as such, looked to the federal government for 
protection. Since the tribe was not a foreign nation, 
Marshall ruled it could not maintain an action in the courts 
of the United States. He said that "if it be true that the 
Cherokee nation have rights, this is not the tribunal in 
which these rights are to be asserted," and denied the motion 
for injunction.1 Although Marshall had actually avoided the 
question of whether the states or the federal government had 
jurisdiction over the Indians, it was a victory for Jackson 
and his policy. The court had not ordered the government to 
restrain Georgia. However, this victory waS short-lived. 
In 1832, a Massachusetts missionary, Samuel Worcester, 
brought suit against the state of Georgia- Worcester had been 
arrested for entering the Cherokee reservation without obtain­
ing a Pass from the state- This violated a new Georgia law 
which prohibited anyone from entering Cherokee land without 
permission. Worcester challenged the law and this time 
Marshall could not claim that he lacked jurisdiction. In his 
, ... l uThe Cherokee Case. rt The North American Revie~t Vol. f~~:II. July, 1831 (Boston. Gray and-Bowen, 18)i). pp. 139­
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decision he again called the Cherokees a "domestic dependent 
n"'tl'on," but t·hoi '" t-l ·me he t deo a. ....0.... aoser e· that they had a right of 
jurisdiction over their soil that was superior to Georgia's 
right. 1 While this appeared a serious threat to the states-
rights cornerstone of Indian policy,. itdid leave an opening 
for Jackson. Marshall's decision did not specifically re­
verse the court's previous decision that it had no power to 
enjoin Georgia from exercising her jurisdiction. Thus, 
making Cherokee sovereignty superior would require United 
2States troops. Jackson merely rerused to use the troops or 
to enforce the decision, and in a matter of speaking, his 
policy has survived the courts. 
As treaties were signed and a considerable number of 
Indians began to migrate west of the Mississippi new prob­
lems arose. There was a definite need to make provision for 
these emigrants and there was a need for a reorganization in 
the administration of Indian affairs. On ~iay 20, 18J4 
Congressman Horace Everett, a member of the Committee on 
Indian Affairs, responded to Jackson' s request for a reorgan­
ization, by presenting three bills. The first was to provide 
for the organization of a Department of Indian Affairs. This 
had long been advocated by men like Calhoun and McKenney, and 
l Mary E. Young, Redskins, Ruffleshlrts end Rednecks; 
Indian Allotments in '-Laham!. ~ Mlss1ss1pe1, 1830-1860 
\Normani University of Oklahoma Press, 1961}, p. 17· 
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Jackson agreed it was necessary. The next bil.l w·as a 
new 
trade and intercourse act which Jackson felt was 
needed to 
regulate trade in the new Indian territory (mhis i 
J. terr tory 
was in present-day Oklahoma). Last of all, a bill was in­
troduced to provide for the establishment of the western 
territory and for the security and protection of the emi­
grant and other tribes therein.1 
The Intercourse Act passed the House without debate, 
was passed by the Senate, and became law. It was basically 
a restatement and codification of past policy.2 It provides 
for the licensing of all traders by agents or SUb-agents and 
excluded foreigners from the Indian trade.3 
The bill entitled "An Act to Provide for the Organiza­
tion of a Department of Indian Affairs" also passed both 
houses easily and became law. This important piece of legis­
lation removed the Governors of territories as superinten­
dents of Indian affairs and established one superintendent 
for all Indians west of the Mississippi at St. Louis. The 
superintendent was charged with exercising general control 
lRegls;;er of Deba.tes in Congress, 2]rd con~., 1st 
Sesa., Vol. X lWashingtona Gales and Seaton, 18}), p. 4200. 
2 . '. thFrancis Paul Prucha. American Indian Pol~c;y In c~s 
Formative Years I The Indian 1rad; and ill IntercOu6sr~.l12Q_~ ~Cambridgel Harvard UnIversity Press, 19 2 , P 
251. 
JRegister Qf Qebates in Congres.§., 23rd Cong., 1st 
Sess., Vol. X. Appendix, p. ~4: 
En 
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over the official conduct and accounts of all ff' 
o lcers and 
persons employed by the government in the Indian d tepar mente 
Under the superintendent a set number of Agencies and sub­
agencies were to be established by the Secretary of War. 
Agents and sub-agents were to manage intercourse with the 
Indians. carry out the instructions of the Secretary of War. 
the Committee on Indian Affairs and the Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs. and implement regUlations of the President 
of the United States.1 This act greatly improved the effi­
ciency of the government in handling Indian affairs. It 
streamlined the Indian office by cutting down personnel. 
establishing a direct chain of command and giving the super­
intendent decision-making power. 
The third bill. entitled "An Act for the Establishment 
of the Western Territory, and for the Security and Protection 
of the Emigrant and other Indian Tribes Therein" floundered 
in the House of Representatives and was never passed. This 
legislation would have established boundaries for the Indian 
territory and guaranteed this land to the Indians and their 
descendents_ In addition. it provided that each tribe would 
organize a government for their own internal affairs, while 
a general council WaS established as the governing body of a 
voluntary confederation of the tribes. This confederation 
would send one delegate to Congress. Finally, the bill 
l Ibig •• Appendix, pp. 347-)48. 
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provided that the territory would have a governor, appointed 
by the President, and it Was hoped that the area would even­
tually become a state. The bill was mainly opposed by 
easterners and John Quincy Adams was the leading opponent.1 
Adams said his main obJ'ection t·o th.e bloll was that it was 
"extraordinary and unconstitutional.tl2 
Adams felt that the bill divested all power over the 
Indians from Congress and put it into the hands of the Presi­
dent. He thought this was wrong and he also believed that 
the United states had no right to regUlate the tribes (in 
spite of the fact that the United States had done this in 
some form for decades). Last of all, Adams objected to the 
eleventh section of the bill which allowed a confederation 
of the tribes in the Indian territory to have a delegate on 
the floor of Congress. He asked members of the House if 
they were ready to admit Indians in their own states as full 
c1t1zens. J 1:!.Ventu.ally the motion was tabled and lost when 
Congress adjourned. Realizing that there was little hope of 
keeping the removal pledges to the Indians if this bill was 
not passed, Jackson and his followers tried to revive it in 
1prancis Paul Pruche, uAndrew Jackson's Indian Policy. 
A Reassessment," Journal of American History, LVI, J 
(December, 1969), p. 537· 
2Register of Debates in COngress, 23rd Cong •• 1st 
Sess., Volo X, p.~?bJ. 
14011835. Representative George R. Gilmer of Oe iorg a moved to 
take up consideration of the bill and told the House that the 
Secretary of War had informed him that the "immediate pas­
sage of this bill was highly imperative. H2 Despite a small 
amount of discussion, the effort was lost and the bill 
failed for the final time. This was the biggest failure in 
Jackson's policy and doomed any chance the Indians had to 
take their place in American society. Despite the fact that 
the bill was the logical conclusion of civilization and edu­
cation efforts, men like John Quincy Adams, Who had supported 
such philanthropic endeavors, defeated it. 
In spite of this failure, Jackson had enough legisla­
tion to aggressively pursue removal. His policy focused in 
two main areas. The first of these was Ohio which con­
tained several smaller, weaker tribes. The second area was 
in the south where the five civilized tribes, Cherokee, 
Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek and Seminole were located. Jackson's 
hard bargaining, his withdrawal of federal protection for the 
Indians, and the extension of state laws over the Indian 
lands combined to make removal efforts completely successful. 
In Ohio Jackson encountered little resistance to removal. 
On May 28. 1831 he appointed James B. Gardiner as a special 
lprucha. American IndiaQ policy, p. 273· 
2Register of Debates in Congres£, 23rd Cong., 2nd 
Sass., Vol. XI {Washingtonl -aafes and Seaton, 1835), p. 
1445. 
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commissioner to treat with the Indians in Ohl·O for removal. 
Gardiner accomplished his task with relative ease, and WaS 
able to clear Ohio of Indians easily and qUickly. By 1832, 
he had concluded removal treaties with the Seneca, Shawnee, 
ottawa and Wyandot tribes. His mission was accomplished.1 
In the south, the strength of the tribes, and the 
progress towards civilization Which they had made caused re­
moval to be more difficult. But Jackson eventually suc­
ceeded. In 1830 the Choctaw signed to remove. The Creeks, 
Seminoles, and Cherokees signed removal treaties in 1835 
and the Chickasaw held out until 1837. The signing of the 
treaties did not make removal a reality. Bitter struggles 
often occurred afterwards and it was many years before the 
tribes were fully removed. However, the treaties did start 
an irreversible process in motion. By 18)6, Jackson told 
Congress that the policy of removal was complete, and once 
again he asked the legislators for a comprehensive system of 
protection, supervision and improvement of the tribes in the 
Indian country.2 Jackson was genuinelY concerned about the 
welfare of the tribes and did not want to abandon them, once 
they were out west. In his farewell address on ~arch 4, 
1837 Jackson was able to say that "the states which have 
IJames D. Richardson (ed.), Message~ ~.Pa~ers £f. the 
presidents, Vol. II (Washingtonl Government Prlntlng Offlce, 
lB9bL p. 372. 
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been so long retarded in their improvement by the Indian 
tribes residing in the midst of them are at length relieved 
.Itfrom the evil • • He continuea by saying that the Indians 
were now in a position where they could share the blessings 
of civilization and be saved from destruction. He concluded 
by adding that "the paternal care of the general government 
will here after watch over them and protect them."t 
The failure of Congress to pass the bill of 18)4 de­
signed to organize the Indian Territory and provide for its 
government would prove to be a serious error on the part of 
the critics of removal. For while that aspect of Jackson's 
program wasn't necessary for the completion of removal opera­
tions, it was the only way the country could keep its promises 
to the removed tribes. Removal was completed, but the Indians 
were denied a chance to take a place in American society, and 
the question of Indian rights plagued and still does plague 
the American conscience. 
III£D----------------­I~, 
Chapter 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
By 1840. removal of the Indiana to the western side 
of the Mississippi was nearly completed. Those Indians who 
hadn't removed were preparing to go or being forced to com­
ply with the removal treaties. The culmination of removal 
marked the end of an era in American Indian policy. Five 
Presidents had tried for almost forty years to make removal 
a reality. Andrew Jackson finally achieved success by 
introducing the one element into the policy which had been 
missing. This was an aggressively energetic pursuit of the 
goals which had been set. Jackson felt that removal was the 
only way in which to save the Indians and felt that the ends 
justified any means he might use. While this caused much 
discussion and anger among his opponents, it was. from a 
pro-removal standpoint. strikingly effective in achieving 
results. 
Throughout the era when removal was being pursued, 
Indian policy emerged as a major nationa.l issue. Yet, it 
never became the central issue on which Presidents focused 
h· d many more pressingtheir attention. The young repu blic· a 
problems. The national debt. reduction of the army, occa­
sional depressions. the public land question, constitutional 
',1112'--------------­
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issues, foreign relations, war, and the National Bank were 
all issues that occupied a greater amount of time for the 
men who ran the United States. Indian affairs, even during 
Jackson's administration, remained a secondary issue. It 
was important, but did not win or lose elections. Many 
facts point this out. Most importantly was the fact that 
the Indian office was always given less money than it needed. 
Forced to economize, the department found it impossible to 
be effective. Added to this was the fact that the army was 
too small to act as an efficient enforcing arm for Indian 
administration. Enforcement of regulations pertaining to 
Indian affairs was haphazard and sporadic at best. All this 
was not helped by the great confusion caused by the loose 
organization of Indian administration. Factory superinten­
dents, army officers, Indian agents, and territorial governors 
all had a hand in running Indian affairs. Often their speci­
fic duties were unclear or overlapped, and often they would 
not cooperate. The only man with real decision-making power 
in Indian affairs was the Secretary of War and he had too 
many other duties to handle every little problem that came 
up concerning Indian administration. Thus, action to correct 
flaws or deficiencies in the running of affairs usually 
lagged. This made any stated policy inconsistently and, as 
has been seen, ineffectively applied. 
Another factor in the long delay to achieve removal 
was the fact that until Andrew Jackson all the Presidents 
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came from eastern or southern Coastal st t 
a eSt Their atti­
tudes were more eastern and they never understood the full 
intensity of Indian problems on the frontl'er J ff
• e erson. 
Madison, Monroe and Adams were all willing to pursue a mild 
policy towards the Indians in order to maintain peace on the 
frontier. Their concern for minimizing the size of the army 
and a reduction of the national debt ruled out any real at­
tempts to deal effectively with Indian problems. They never 
understood the attitudes of the western frontiersmen and 
farmers, who clamored for more land and more protection. 
The attempts of Jefferson and Madison tD obtain Indian land 
through cessions were inspired as much by defense needs and 
foreign relations considerations as they were by western 
clamor. Both these men pursued self-defeating policies. 
They attempted to keep the Indians peaceful, but kept de­
manding more land. This increased hostilities and the out­
come was obvious. Finally. after the War of 1812, with 
Indian military power broken in both the northwest and the 
south Madison, Monroe and Adams were still reluctant to 
carryon a large, expans i ve Indian policy to satisfy the 
land demands of westerners. This was in spite of the fact 
that the ouster of the British had opened up the frontier 
and thousands of white Americans were pouring in and pressing 
Ind·.l'ftn m·.l'litary power in the north-Upon Indian land. Also., a 
west and the south had been seriously weakened and the tribes 
Could not defend themselves. 
(~--------------­
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The very least the government should h~ve 
a. done was 
to increase the number of troops and forts on the frontier 
in order to protect the several trl'bes. Even if removal 
could not be achieved there were a set of principles which 
had emerged as the policy of the United	 St~tes 
Cl government. 
These included the protection of Indian rights to their land 
by the setting up of definite boundaries for Indian country 
and the restriction of whites from it. The government had 
the duty of removing illegal white intruders and punishing 
men for crimes against the Indians. Also it was the object 
of the government to regulate and restrict the Indian trade 
and prohibit liquor from entering Indian country. Added to 
this was the assertion that only the government could acquire 
land from the Indians, and finally there was the policy of 
promoting civilization and education among the Indians. 1 
Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Adams and Jackson had neither 
the money nor men to achieve these goalse In order to pur­
sue these policies effectively a large, organized enforce­
ment agency was needed. The army waS the obvious agent to 
do the enforcing, but instead of being increased the size of 
the army was slashed from 10,000 to 6,000 in 1821. This 
' ble Since these weremade any of the above goals unattalna	 • 
v the Indians beforedoomed, the only alternative was t 0 remo e 
' 1 nd and cheatedthe white pressed in around them. sto1e	 thelr a 
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them in trade. Jefferson and Madison tried to keep up with 
white pressure with land cessions, but this was impossible. 
Monroe and Adams attempted to do the job with moderate re­
moval and it is not unlikely to SUppose that if this moder­
ate policy had continued for forty more years the great 
tribes of the south would have virtually disappeared. 
The arrival of Andrew Jackson in the White House 
changed this. Jackson's western attitudes and frontier ex­
perience made him well aware of what was happening on the 
frontier and well aware of the Indian's plight. Theoretical­
ly, Jackson could have tried to protect the Indians where 
they were, but he knew the army was not large enough to 
patrol the entire frontier. His knowledge of the frontier 
and the men on it made him inclined to believe in removal. 
He pursued this policy aggressively and, at times, ruthless­
ly. Many of his methods were not commendable and yet his 
policy did move the Indians out of the way of white pressure 
for a time and gave them a second chance. He probably did 
save these tribes from cultural extinction. In the Indian 
territory the redman had time to adopt the white customs 
and the government had time to become stronger. The tribes 
did not disintegrate, but in fact, grew, prospered and as 
PIes of whiteh b t XGrant Foreman has said, equalled tees e am 
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-

frontier settlement,l 
Francis Prucha agrees, and of the four alternatives 
he listed he concluded that only removal was workable. The 
first alternative was, of course, the complete destruction 
2 
or annihilation of the tribes. Jackson could not and would 
not use this. He had never advocated the extermination of 
the Indians. He had worked with them and treated them as 
human beings, Deapite the fact that many frontiersmen did 
advocate annihilation, Jackson always fought the idea. 
The second alternative was a speedy assimilation of 
the tribes. Prucha concludes this was impossible for the 
simple reason that it was not the goal of' most Indians to 
become white men. J If the redman was going to assimilate, 
it would take time that the white pressure east of the 
Mississippi would not give them. 
Prucha saw the third alternative as placing the 
Indians in reserves east of the Mississippi which would 
be surrounded by white settlement. The enclaves would be 
protected by the army from white intrusion. As has been 
1Grant Foreman, India.n Remov~. The Emigr~tion of 
the Five Civilized Tribes of IndIan!! (Norman. Unlversi ty 
of -O'kIihoma Press, 19)2), p:- 386. 
2 .. itA d Jackson' s Indian Policy.FranCiS Paul Prucha,. n raw. . . LVI J 
A Reassessment Journal of America!} Hlstory,II , 
(December, 1969).-P. 534.­
1 
""'Ibid., p. 535. 
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seen it would have been impossible to prov"d " 1 e a standlng 
army of such strength. Also this would not h b . 
ave een posslble 
in the light of the state-federal conflict which existed.1 
This left removal as the only answer, and if removal was to 
work it would have to be pursued aggressively and quickly. 
Jackson was willing to do this, and eventually achieved re­
sults. Although his methods must be questioned. his inten­
tions seemed honorable. Removal could not have been the 
policy of Indian-haters if such men as John C. Calhoun. 
Thomas McKenney and Lewis Cass supported it. It emerged as 
the only solution to an enormous problem. 
During this entire study the author has tried to 
avoid value judgments and present a descriptive narrative 
of the men and events concerning Indian policy. At this 
point. it is difficult not to defend the removal policy. 
From 1800 to 1837 all evidence indicated that the majority 
of Indians were deteriorating in that their culture and way 
of life was being ruined by alcohol. illegal and unfair 
trade. and white farmers. This was in spite of efforts by 
federal authorities to protect them. It was true that many 
federal officials were corrupt and tried only half-heartedly 
to enforce the Intercourse Acts; but for every bad govern­
ment employee there was at least one honest, sympathetic 
and sincere official, who attempted to do his job. Even 
lIbido 
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Andrew Jackson as commander of the southern ilit . 
m. ary dIS­
trict of the United States attempted to remove white set­
tlers from ·Indian land. The frontier was ~l'mpl t 
.. Y 00 expan­
sive and the white intruders were too aggressive, impatient 
and numerous to allow protection to be a viable alternative. 
Assimilation had, for the moat part, failed since the early 
1600's and it was not conceivable that, as many Indian sup­
porters claimed, it would succeed in one or two generations. 
It was true that Indians who hadEdopted white customs did 
rise to the economic control of the tribes and did very 
well by white standards. John Ross of the Cherokee, Greenwood 
LaFlore of the Choctaw, and George and Levi Colbert of the 
Chickasaw were all good exa~ples of this. However, these men 
were, for the most part, mixed-bloods and seldom represented 
the views of the full-blood or so-called "common" Indians. 
The two groups did join together in the fight against re­
moval, but usually for different reasons. Mixed-bloods had 
a vested economic stake, which they sought to preserve, while 
the full-bloods wished to remain in the land of their fore­
fathers and attempt to preserve their traditional way of 
life. The mixed-bloods usually discarded the old ways, wore 
whi te clothes and adopted white customs. They became weal thy 
and often did not remove with the tribes, but stayed in the 
LaFlore wassouth and became influential plantation owners. 
a good example of this. 
although it had been practicedPhysical annihilation, 
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in colonial New England, and Was advocated b' ,Y some frontiers­
men, was never even cons idered as an 13.1te1l"'l"''''t· b 
....JQ. ~ve Y national 
leaders. The use of such a policy would ce.rtai'nl· h y ave been 
a disgrace to the whole civilized world. Yet. CUltural 
annihilation waS practiced throughout the period.. Mission­
aries who tried to civilize the Indians were attempting to 
destroy Indian civilization, and the failure of the moder­
ate protection policies of Madison, Monroe, Calhoun and 
Adams also meant the cultural doom of the tribes. 
This appeared to leave only removal, but by 1830 
Theodore Frelinghuysen developed one last a1 ternative to 
the policy. He indicated his willingness to resort to civil 
war to protect Indian rights. Apparently this action was 
expected to coerce Georgia. Mississippi, and Alabama into 
recognizing tribal land and government rights for all times. 
Fortunately, this was never taken seriously by any other 
national leaders. During the 18)0 I s the state-federal con­
flict in South Carolina and Georgia was important enough 
that the southern states may have given the federal govern­
ment all the civil war it could handle. No matter who won 
the obvious loser would have been the Indians. Such an 
event would have given the southern states a chance to 
'h'I ti n and it ispractice physical and cultural annll a 0 t 
probable that within months the Indians would have had no 
land and nowhere to go. 
th logical choice.As a resul t removal emerged as . e 
'-------------­~3" 
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convincing the Indians of this was the biggest problem. 
Madison, Monroe, Calhoun and Adams 11 f .a alled to do this. 
Andrew Jackson did not even try. He bUllied the tribes into 
signing removal treaties and then forced them to comply. 
Jackson used any method possible to pursue removal. The 
fact that throughout his career Jackson denied the propriety 
of treaties and then as President used them to full advant­
age showed the willingness of the man to achieve his goal 
through any means. Jackson's aggressive methods made re­
moval a reality, but also led to the greatest tragedy con­
nected with the policy. This was the death, starvation and 
discomfort of many Indians during the trip west. Attempting 
to move over 60,000 Indians from the south alone was no 
small task. The speed with Which this beCame necessary led 
to the mismanagement, inefficiency and corruption which 
accompanied actual removal operations. This was tragic and 
unnecessary and cannot be condoned. However, history it­
self has born out the correctness of removal. In 1973 the 
very thought of moving an entire race of people from their 
homes seems incredibly unjust, and in the refined, intro­
spective society of todaY it is very easy to criticize 
former leaders for this action. But in wild, unsettled, 
restless and aggressive early 19th century America the 
policy could easily be seen as just and correct. It is un­
fair to judge a bygone era by artificial standards which 
they never conceived. The mere fact that the revival of 
i?\llS--------------__._
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interest in Indian culture which has taken place in the 
early 1970's is based upon cultures. which men of the 1830's 
found a way to preserve long enough to be revived. is an 
endorsement for the removal policy. 
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